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INTRODUCTION

April of 1992, a Federal court in Boston convicted Paulita
Cadiz, a nineteen-year old pregnant woman with no prior criminal record, of aiding drug dealers.1 According to the government,
Lazaro Delgado was driving through Boston when he saw Cadiz,
2
then eighteen years old, accompanied by a fourteen-year old child.
Delgado asked them if they wanted a ride. They got in Delgado's
car and he drove off. He eventually stopped the car and told Cadiz
to go around a corner, meet a woman, Mersky, and bring her back
* Judge, General District Court, City of Richmond, Virginia; former Associate
Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary. B.A.,
1969, Howard University; J.D. 1972, University of Virginia. The author would like

to thank Paul Marcus and Richard Williamson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Mathew Brelis, Woman's Conviction Sparks Controversy over Mandatory Term,

BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 1992, at 1. Four of Cadiz's co-defendants chose to appeal,
but Cadiz did not. United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1232 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, Martinez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995).

2. Brelis, supra note 1, at 2.

(335)
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to the car. 3 Cadiz walked Mersky to Delgado's car. Mersky then
went to another nearby car and purchased crack cocaine. 4 Unknown to Delgado and Cadiz, Mersky was an undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent. 5 She had recorded her
conversation with Cadiz while walking to Delgado's car, in which
'6
Cadiz had stated, "[j]ust go to the car, it will go quickly."
Although Cadiz claimed she was an innocent participant, she
was found guilty of engaging in a drug conspiracy. 7 Ironically, Delgado was acquitted." Cadiz, because of inferences the jury made
from her ten-minute car ride with Delgado and her one-minute,
twenty-second conversation with the undercover agent, faced a
grim future: a mandatory ten-year prison sentence. 9
In December of 1992, a Los Angeles federal judge sentenced

another first-time

offender, Johnny F. Patillo, to

a ten-year

mandatory prison term. 10 JudgeJ. Spencer Letts sentenced Patillo,
a twenty-seven-year old black male, for his role in attempting to ship
a package that contained 681 grams of crack cocaine.1 " He had

been a "mule," a minor player in the drug trafficking trade. The
federal judge, known as a strong advocate of stiff criminal sanctions

for drug offenders, lamented imposing the ten-year mandatory
minimum in Patillo's case, stating that "my conscience ...

requires

3. Id.
4. Id.at 3.
5. Id.at 1.
6.Id.at 2-3.
7. Cadiz claimed that Delgado told her to bring the woman to the car because
he did not speak English well and the woman owed him money. Brelis, supranote
1, at 2-3. Cadiz's lawyers had tried, without success, to arrange a plea agreement
before trial in which she would have plead guilty to a lesser offense and thus
avoided the mandatory sentence. Id.
8. Id. at 1, 3.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993); see also Jim
Newton, Judge Denounces Mandatory Sentencing Law Courts; Jurist Gives First-Time Drug
Offender a 10-Year Term But Calls System That Imposes the FederalGuidelines "Barbaric,"
LA. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at B1.
11. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. at 839. Federal sentencing laws mandate stiff penalties for crack offenders. For sentencing purposes, one gram of crack is equivalent
to 100 grams of powder cocaine. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2DI.I(c) (Drug Quantity Table) (1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G].
Therefore, if this defendant had possessed the same amount of powder cocaine,
he would have faced a minimum sentence of five years. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) (1) (B) (ii) (1988) (imposing mandatory minimum five year penalty for
selling 500 grams of cocaine); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (ii) (1988) (mandating
minimum ten-year penalty for selling five kilograms of cocaine); U.S.S.G., supra,
§ 2D1.1 (c) (11) (outlining drug quantity table and giving same offense level to selling 100 grams of cocaine and one gram of cocaine base (crack)).
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that I avoid intentional injustice." 12 Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) required imprisonment of twelve to fifteen years, the judge departed from the Guidelines as far as he
legally could, noting that a twelve-year sentence for a first-time offender with a spotless prior record "is worse than uncivilized, it is
13
barbaric."
On May 12, 1986, Michigan police detained Ronald Harmelin
for failing to stop his car at a red light.1 4 After finding marijuana in
Harmelin's jacket pocket, the police arrested Harmelin and impounded his car. A later search of the car revealed a gym bag in the
trunk which contained cocaine and $2,900.15 Harmelin was convicted of possessing 672.5 grams of cocaine. 16 A Michigan statute
authorized a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of
650 grams or more of cocaine. Harmelin, a first offender, was sen17
tenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole.
First time offenders Cadiz, Patillo and Harmelin received
lengthy mandatory prison sentences because they committed drug
crimes. Drug crimes, drug-related crimes and drug use have increased dramatically within the last fifteen years, and the recognition that something must be done to combat the problem of drugs
and crime is commendable. However, the response has focused on
only one remedy: incarceration.
The American public is increasingly frustrated with high crime
rates fueled by drugs. In a recent poll, the public ranked crime as
the most important problem facing the country, leading both the
economy and health care, 18 and no single element has had more
impact on crime in recent years than the influx of drugs. 19 Not
12. Newton, supra note 10, at B2.
13. Id. at B3; see also Patillo,817 F. Supp. at 841 ("I... will no longer apply this
law without protest ....Statutory mandatory minimum sentences create injustice
because the sentence is determined without looking at the particular defendant.").
14. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), cert. granted
in part, 495 U.S. 956 (1990), and aff'd, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
15. Id. at 78.

16. Id. at 76.
17. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 n.1 (1991). The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that the defendant's sentence was not cruel and unusual and therefore did not violate the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 996.
18. Crime Replaces Economy as Top Concern in Poll, GAINESVILLE SUN, Jan. 23,
1994, at 2A. Nineteen percent of those surveyed in a January, 1994, poll said crime
or violence was the nation's most important problem, whereas one year earlier,
only one percent ranked crime as the most important problem. Id.
19. At least 60% of violent crime is associated with drug use. Michael Kramer,
Clinton's DrugPolicy Is a Bust, TIME, Dec. 20, 1993, at 35. For additional statistics on
the correlation between drug use and crime, see infra notes 31-33, 36-40. This
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surprisingly, much of the concern about crime is related to the escalating "drug crisis" and to the proliferation of drug-trafficking
violence.
The response to both the "drug crisis" and the crime rate has
been identical - aggressive enforcement of existing criminal statutes and proposals for new legislation with tougher criminal sanctions. For politicians and legislators, being tough on crime is
indispensable to survival. Toughness generally means putting more
people in prison, detaining them there longer and carrying out
more executions.
However, by comparing our current incarceration rates with
either those of earlier times or with the current systems in other
countries, the evidence strongly indicates that we are already extremely "tough on crime." In fact, we have the world's highest rate
of incarceration. 20 The actual number of persons in prisons and
jails in the United States soared from about 250,000 to almost 1.25
million in the last twenty years. 21 Our current use of incarceration
is based on the perception that because incarceration has been an
effective crime control method in the past, if we provide enough
law enforcement and corrections resources to make the punitive
sanction of incarceration more certain and severe, it should work in
the future as well. This focus on incarceration increases public expectations about the response to crime and places even greater
political pressure on legislators to become "tougher" on crime by
enacting legislation with even harsher penalties.
We are obsessed with incarceration.2 2 Moreover, our obsession
is now an addiction, for we are unduly and perhaps irrationally dependent on incarceration. This Article analyzes this addiction, excorrelation has been noted by many politicians. For example, during the 1992
Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton argued that it is impossible to get serious about
crime without getting serious about drugs. Kramer, supra, at 35.
20. Lock-'em-up Leader of the World BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1992, (Editorial),
at 10. Our rate of incarceration in 1990 rose to 455 inmates per 100,000 population. Id. This statistic exceeded that of the former Soviet Union and South Africa,
a comparison not wholly appropriate because many prisoners are political, rather
than "street" criminals. Id. See generally MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS:
ONE YEAR LATER 1 (The Sentencing Project 1992).
21. See BUREAU oF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1990, at 604 (1991) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1990]; see also ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN

1990, at 1 (1991) (finding 134% increase in prison population from 1980 to 1990);
U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, JAIL INMATES
1989, at 1 (1990) (finding 15% increase in jail population from 1988 to 1989).
22. See LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE USE OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section 1992).
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plores whether incarceration is an effective response and considers
available alternatives to incarceration.
Part II of this Article describes the problem: the "drug crisis,"
the crime rate and the relationship between drugs and crime. 23
Part III examines the federal legislative response to the problem:
two federal anti-drug statutes, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the anti-crime legislation recently passed by Congress. 4 This
part also discusses the judicial response to the incarceration mindset. Part IV addresses the issues of why lengthy or mandatory imprisonment is supposed to be effective and whether imprisonment
is an appropriate response to the problem.2 5 This part argues that
imprisonment neither enhances public safety nor decreases the
"drug crisis." Part V suggests alternative punitive responses that
lead to a positive theory of punishing drug offenders and to a more
efficient crime control methodology. 26 Altogether, these alternatives seek justice for society as a whole, and for the future Harmelins, Patillos and Cadizes.
II.

DRUGS & CRIME:

THE PROBLEM

Although the United States has spent more than $100 billion
on the drug war since 1981, the public still has ready access to
drugs.2 7 A 1991 survey revealed that 74.4 million (36.2%) of Americans aged twelve and older reported using an illegal drug at least
once during their lifetime. 2 8 Cocaine, both powdered and base
(crack), remains the primary drug for many abusers. For those
adults under the age of twenty-five, an estimated 15.8% have used
cocaine at least once, and for those between the ages of twenty-six
and thirty-four, an estimated 25.2% have used cocaine. 29 However,
23. For a background discussion of the drug crisis, see infra notes 27-45 and
accompanying text.
24. For an examination of the federal government's response to the drug crisis in both the Congress and the courts, see infra notes 46-169 and accompanying
text.
25. For an analysis of whether incarceration adequately responds to the drug
problem, see infra notes 170-205 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of alternative methods of crime control, see infra notes
206-32 and accompanying text.
27. Kramer, supra note 19, at 35. Federal spending on drug control increased
from less than $2 billion in 1981 to $13.1 billion in 1993. Id.

28. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1992, at 25 (1993) (noting that approximately 11%
reported drug use during past year, while 5.5% reported use during month pre-

ceding survey).
29. Id. at 59.
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while cocaine use appears to have stabilized, heroin and marijuana
30
use is rising.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in
1992, one violent crime occurred every twenty-two seconds and one
crime index offense 3 occurred every two seconds. 3 2 There is extensive evidence of the relationship between drug use and this
crime rate. Drug users report greater involvement in crime and are
more likely than non-users to have criminal records. 3 3 Additionally,
30. See Use of Heroin, Marijuana Up, Report Shows, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
May 12, 1994, at A7 (noting statement of Director of Office of National Drug Control Policy, Lee Brown, that heroin "has the potential of making a deadly comeback ... I think it's endemic").
31. The crime index is used to measure fluctuations in the volume and rate of
crime. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 5 (1993) [hereinafter CRIME REPORTS, 1993]. The crime index is

composed of violent crimes (murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson). Id. Between 1991 and 1992, there was a 1.1% increase in the violent crime rate. Id. at 10. Between 1984 and 1992, the murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter rate (number of offenses per 100,000 inhabitants
of the United States) increased from 7.9% to 9.3%. Id. at 13; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

6 (1985)

[hereinafter CRIME REPORTS, 1985]. The statistics for forcible rape, robbery and
aggravated assault also showed increases between 1984 and 1992: rape increased
from 35.7% to 42.8%; robbery increased from 205.4% to 263.6%; and aggravated
assault increased from 290.2% to 441.8%. CRIME REPORTS, 1993, supra, at 23, 26,
31; CRIME REPORTS, 1985, supra, at 13, 16, 21.
32. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM

CRIME REPORTS 6, 14 (1994) [hereinafter CRIME REPORTS, 1994]. Although serious
crimes reported to the police declined three percent from 1992 to 1993, murders
rose three percent. Id. From 1992 to 1993, rapes declined four percent and robberies declined two percent. Id. at 24, 27. However, given prior increases in the
crime rate, one can take little comfort in the small overall decrease in the 1993
crime index. The crime index total had also dropped 2.9% from 1991 to 1992, the
first decline recorded since 1984. CRIME REPORTS, 1993, supra note 31, at 5. The
1992 level showed virtually no change from the 1988 level and was nine percent
above the 1983 total. Id. at 6.
33. A 1989 Bureau ofJustice Statistics survey of inmates in local jails reported
that 77.7% of jail inmates, 79.6% of state prisoners and 82.7% of youth in longterm public juvenile facilities had used a drug at some point in their lives. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG AND CRIME FACTS, 1992,
at 7 (1993) [hereinafter DRUG AND CRIME FACTS, 1992]. One-fourth of convicted
jail inmates, one-third of state prisoners and two-fifths of youths in long-term facilities reported being under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the
offense resulting in their incarceration. Id. at 4. In 1991, the National Institute of
Justice's Drug Use Forecasting Program found that the percentage of male arrestees testing positive for an illicit drug at the time of arrest ranged from 36% in
Omaha to 75% in San Diego. Id. at 6. Female arrestees testing positive ranged
from 45% in San Antonio to 79% in Cleveland. Id. "About 2 out of 3 State prison
inmates reported they had used drugs as frequently as once a week or more for a
period of at least a month at some time." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME AND THEJUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1992) [hereinafter
DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM].
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approximately seventy percent of the nation's 1.4 million prisoners
34
have drug problems.
In addition to drug-defined offenses, 35 numerous drug-related
offenses are committed by drug users. Some offenses are caused, in
part, by a drug's pharmacologic effect. Drugs such as cocaine, amphetamines and PCP, for example, affect physiological function,
cognitive ability and mood. These effects increase the likelihood
that users will act violently; at least sixty percent of violent crime is
associated with drug use.3 6 Moreover, in a 1990 study, researchers
determined that victims perceived that their offenders were under
37
the influence of drugs in more than 336,000 crimes of violence.
Other drug-related offenses may be motivated by the user's
need for money to support continued use. Overall, 13.3% of convictedjail inmates in 1989 said that they committed their offense to
obtain money for drugs.38 Some users commit property crimes to
support their habits. 3 9 Other users resort to prostitution, or increase their prostitution activity to finance their drug habits when
40
drug prices rise.
Many other drug-related offenses, and particularly violent offenses such as assaults and murders, are connected with drug traf34. Kramer, supra note 19, at 35.
35. Drug-defined offenses involve the possession, use, distribution, sale or
manufacture of illegal drugs.
36. Kramer, supra note 19, at 35. In 1986, 3.9% of the 19,257 homicides in
which circumstances were known were narcotics-related. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS, 1991, at 7 (1992)
[hereinafter DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS, 1991]. Within three years, the rate had almost doubled to 7.4%. Id.
37. DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 5; see also DRUG
AND CRIME FACTS, 1992, supra note 33, at 4 (finding that in 33% of violent crimes in
1991, victims believed that their assailants were under influence of drugs or alcohol). Moreover, among violent offenders in state prisons in 1986, "drugs or alcohol were most likely to be implicated in manslaughter cases (76% of offenders or
victims were using either or both) and least likely to be implicated in sexual assault
cases (50% of offenders or victims were using [them])." DRUGS, CRIME AND THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 5. In 1989, more than half of all jail inmates
reported being under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense
resulting in their incarceration. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DRUG DATA
SUMMARY, 1992, at 3.
38. DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS, 1991, supra note 36, at 7.
39. Id. ("Almost a third of those convicted of robbery and burglary committed
their crime to obtain money for drugs, as had about a quarter of those in jail for
larceny and fraud."). Drug addicts commit 15 times as many robberies and 20
times as many burglaries as criminals who do not use drugs. Kramer, supra note
19, at 35.
40. DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 7. A 1990 study
found that "81% of the females and 49% of the males arrested for prostitution and
being held in jail who were voluntarily tested were found positive for drugs." Id.
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ficking itself. To avoid arrest, drug dealers commit violent crimes
against police, informants or witnesses. 41 Furthermore, other violent crimes are common among participants in drug trafficking,
and because they want to avoid the police, much of this violence is
not reported. 42 In many cases, interactional circumstances create a
drug-crime relationship. Being involved in drug use and crime are
sometimes common features of a deviant lifestyle. A wide range of
psychological, social and economic incentives can combine to produce drug use and crime patterns that become firmly established in
some persons. The likelihood and frequency of involvement in illegal activity is increased because drug users are exposed to situations
that encourage crime, and the "crime" may be neither a drug-de43
fined crime nor a drug-related crime.
As a result, crimes rise in number as offender drug use in44
creases, because active drug users commit offenses at high rates.
Moreover, frequent use of multiple drugs generally follows involvement in property crime, and its onset may accelerate the development of a criminal career. 45 In sum, drug use and crime are not
only related, but highly correlated.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE

The addictive response to the "drugs and crime" relationship
has been incarceration. The textual support for this addiction is
found in the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, the Guidelines, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
and the most recent United States Supreme Court decision addressing the imprisonment of drug offenders.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.
43. In addition, persons with criminal records are much more likely than
ones without criminal records to report being drug users. According to two national studies, the majority of persons "in drug treatment had been arrested or
incarcerated, or had admitted committing crimes for economic gain before entering treatment." DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 4. "The
Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP) found that 87% had been arrested and
71% had been in jail or prison before entering treatment." Id. "The Treatment
Outcome Prospective Study (TOPS) found that about 60% of those entering publicly-funded residential treatment programs ... said they had committed one or
more crimes for economic gain in the year before treatment." Id.
44. DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 4.
45. SeeJan M. Chaiken & Marcia R. Chaiken, Drugs and Predatoy Crime, in 13
CRIME AND JUSTICE 203, 235 (Michael Tonry &James Q. Wilson eds., 1990) (stating
that "there is strong evidence that predatory offenders who persistently and frequently use large amounts of multiple types of drugs commit crimes at significantly
higher rates over longer periods than do less drug-involved offenders").
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A.

Legislative Response

1. Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988
Prior to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 Act), 46 federal
judges had maximum flexibility to tailor sentences to the particular
circumstances of each case, in accordance with the prevailing emphasis on offender rehabilitation. 47 Judges could sentence drug offenders to long or short incarceration periods or probation, and
offenders could be paroled. 48 The 1986 Act, however, radically
transformed this aspect of judicial sentencing. It imposed
mandatory minimum sentences, deleted the sentence of probation
or parole for most drug offenses, lengthened terms of incarceration
49
and significantly increased monetary penalties.
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act mandated a five to forty year
sentence, without probation or parole, for first offenders convicted
of possession with intent to distribute small quantities of designated
drugs.50 In response to the escalating trafficking of larger quanti46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-969 (1988).
47. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (noting that judges
were capable of individualizing sentences according to recidivist behavior and
goals of reformation and rehabilitation).
48. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (1988); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988). Between 1914 and 1984, Congress passed over 50 statutes in response to illegal drug
trafficking. In 1956, Congress began its attempts to articulate an effective drug
control strategy. For example, it established mandatory sentences for many drug
distribution and importation crimes. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, ch. 629, 70
Stat. 567 (1956) (codified throughout U.S.C., and repealed in 1970). Apparently,
these mandatory sentences were not effective in addressing the drug problem, because in 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 (1988)). This Act eliminated mandatory minimums for all drug offenses
except those involving continuing criminal enterprises. Id.; see William W. Wilkins,
Jr., et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs Era,"28 WAKE FOREST L.
Rrv. 305, 326 (1993). A subsequent statute, the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, amended the 1970 Act by mandating sentencing determinations
based on the weight of the drug involved in the offense. See Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 3257 (listing factors judges
should consider in imposing sentence and requiring judge to impose sentence
within guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists).
49. See H.R REp. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 10, 24-25 (1986).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (1988). The designated quantities were at least
100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of cocaine mixture, 5 grams of crack, 10 grams of
PCP, 1 gram of LSD, or 100 kilograms of marijuana mixture. Id. No mandatory
minimums were prescribed for first time offenders convicted of possession of
smaller quantities of drugs, and while repeat offenders faced mandatory minimums ranging from 15 to 90 days, federal judges could authorize probation, depending on the number of prior convictions. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), (b) (1) (1988).
This footnote and those below omit references to the prescribed fines for drug
offenses.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3

344

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 335

ties of drugs, the 1986 Act mandated a sentence of ten years to life,
without probation or parole, for first offenders convicted of possession with intent to distribute larger quantities of drugs.5 1 Moreover, if the offender caused death or bodily injury, these mandatory
52
minimums were doubled to twenty years.
The 1988 Amendments to the Act increased the mandatory
minimum sentences, increased the other maximum sentences and
increased the monetary penalties previously prescribed in the 1986
Act. 53 In addition, the 1988 Amendments significantly increased
the penalties for possession offenses, provided for the eviction of
public housing residents if any member or guest of the household
was involved in certain drug offenses, and established the death
penalty for offenders engaging in "continuing criminal enterprises"
54
who commit or order murder to further the criminal enterprise.
These provisions were intended to control and to prevent the rising
"drug epidemic" by incapacitating drug offenders, and indicated a
further shift from any rehabilitative themes in pre-1986 statutes.
More importantly, Congress increased the penalties for low
level drug offenses. The 1988 Amendments increased the
mandatory minimums mentioned above, imposed mandatory minimums for the simple possession of smaller quantities of drugs, deleted provisions authorizing probation, parole or suspended
sentences, and prescribed stiffer penalties for first time offenders
possessing crack or any other cocaine-based substance. 55 Penalties
for crimes involving crack were harsher than those prescribed for
56
first time offenders possessing other drugs.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1) (1988). Under the 1986 Act, the designated
quantities were 1 kilogram of heroin, 5 kilograms of cocaine mixture, 100 grams of
PCP, 50 grams of crack, 1000 grams of marijuana, or 10 grams of LSD. Id.
52. Id.
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). This was the first federal capital sanction since
the Supreme Court abolished all existing death penalties in 1972.
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (1988) (doubling mandatory sentences and
deleting discretionary probation provisions for persons with prior conviction for
simple possession); see also 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988) (prescribing two years imprisonment or $1,000 fine or both for simple possession, and either doubling (for one
prior conviction) or tripling (for two prior convictions) mandatory sentence for
repeat offenders).
56. The 1988 Amendments also prescribed a mandatory minimum of five
years, with a maximum of 20 years, for first time offenders convicted of si mple
possession of more than five grams of crack. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988). The penalty for first time offenders convicted of simple possession of more than five grams
of heroin is imprisonment of not more than one year, a $1,000 fine, or both. Id.
The penalty for selling 500 grams of cocaine is at least five years, id.
§ 841 (b) (1) (B), while the penalty for selling five kilograms of crack is at least 10
years. Id. § 841 (b) (1) (A). These statutes have been widely criticized. See, e.g., Ger-
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The 1988 Amendments also increased the penalties for higher
level drug offenses. They doubled the mandatory minimum for
first offenders convicted of possession with intent to distribute to
ten years, without probation, parole or the possibility of suspended
sentence, and increased the mandatory minimum to twenty years
for first time offenders, if the offense resulted in death or bodily
injury. 57 Moreover, as noted above, the 1988 Amendments authorized the death penalty for drug offenders engaging in a "continuing
criminal enterprise" who murder or authorize murder during the
58
course of the drug offense.
The incarceration penalties in the 1986 and 1988 Acts were
intended to promote the penological goals of specific and general
deterrence, and incapacitation. Congress wanted to send "a
message across the country that the war on drugs is on, and it will
be wop" because drug offenders will either be imprisoned or executed.59 For example, deterrence was the major issue for proponents and opponents of the death penalty. Proponents argued that
drug dealers who murdered were "merchants of death" who would
understand and be deterred by the death penalty. 60 Opponents argued that drug dealers "have no fear of death" or that capital pun6
ishment simply does not deter crime. '
ald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guideline Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 161 (1991); Sam V. Maddis, Is the Drug War Racist? DisparitiesSuggest the
Answer Is "Yes, " USA TODAY, July 23, 1993, at IA. Numerous courts have rejected
an' equal protection challenge to these provisions and similar provisions in the
Guidelines under a racial disparity theory. See United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d
604, 612 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that Guidelines did not violate defendant's Equal
Protection rights in equating 100 units of powder cocaine to one unit of crack), cert
denied, 114 S.Ct. 2754 (1994); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1213 (8th
Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (same),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1661 (1993); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897-98
(5th Cir. 1992) (same). But see United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 797 (E.D.
Mo.) (holding that disproportionate penalties for crack cocaine violate Equal Protection Clause), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1172
(1995).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1988).
58. 21 U.S.C § 848 (1988).
59. 132 CONG. REc. H6519-01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Jones).
60. 134 CONG. RuG. H7280 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Manton). "The time is long overdue for us to deal with these sleazy drug czars in the
harshest manner possible, and in the only manner these merchants of death understand." Id.
61. 134 CONG. RuG. H7265 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Rangel) ("The bums that are out there every day dealing in drugs have no fear of
death."); 134 CONG. REc. H7266 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) ("If there were any evidence to suggest that capital punishment deters,
the issue before us might be closer, but there is no such evidence.").
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As to lengthy imprisonment terms, however, the deterrent
value of punishment was less clear. Congress assumed that drug
dealers facing severe mandatory penalties would refrain from criminal activities, because they assumed that these offenders (1) understood basic utilitarian "cost-benefit" analysis, 62 (2) would conclude
the penological "costs" of their illegal activities outweighed the
"benefits," and (3) would cease such activities. One member of the
Senate argued that the "offsetting costs . .. [in prior laws were]
relatively small. The chances of being intercepted [were] not great
... [and, if caught and convicted] the penalties [were] nothing
63
more than a small cost of doing business."
This assessment of the "rational drug offender" is somewhat
inconsistent with another assessment prevalent in the Congressional debate on the Acts. Some members of Congress felt that
drug offenders were inhuman or "non-citizens" and had lost all
legal protections and civil rights guaranteed others. One Senator
referred to all drug offenders as enemies and a "scourge" on society.64 Low level drug couriers were referred to as "animals"; other
dealers were referred to as "bums," "thugs," "sleazy drug lords" or
"merchants of death."65
Thus, while focusing on deterrence, Congress also indicated
that drug offenders were non-human, and could not engage in the
rational thinking that leads to specific deterrence or behavior modification. In addition, Congress never focused on the deterred, but
rather on the non-rehabilitated offender. When Congress expressed apparent concern about rehabilitation, it was viewed only as
62. The underlying premise of utilitarianism is that a person predicts the benefits and burdens from a course of conduct and then engages in conduct that has
the greatest benefits, or produces the greatest pleasure. Utilitarians assume
human beings, because they can experience pleasure and pain, will seek to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. To determine which conduct causes the greatest pleasure, one considers the benefits and burdens of everyone who would be
affected by the particular course of conduct. JOHN S. MILL, UTILIrARIANISM 16
(1861).
63. 132 CONG. REc. S14,270-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
64. 132 CONG. Rc. S12,215 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Byrd).
65. 132 CONG. REc. H86,608-06 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep.
McKinney); 134 CONG. REc. H7894-03 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Rangel); 134 CONG. REc. H7259-02 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar); 134 CONG. REc. S15,963-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Gramm); 134 CONG. REc. H11,108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Manton); 134 CONG. Rac. H7280 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Manton).
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a means of promoting specific deterrence. 6 6
Incapacitation was the other Congressional goal. Legislators
wanted certain and severe minimum periods of imprisonment to
"get the pushers out of our schoolyards and drugs off of our
streets. "67 The public desperately wanted a "solution" to the drug
crisis, and lengthy periods of incarceration, even if incarceration
only incapacitated drug offenders, was the solution. 68 One Senator
noted that "dealers should know with certainty that if they are
caught and convicted, they will be headed for the penitentiary and
they will stay there for years.... In other words, for a number of
years the key will be thrown away." 69 Congress thus prescribed
lengthy mandatory penalties and hoped that current or potential
offenders would either be deterred or physically restrained from
committing drug offenses.
2.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines

In 1983, after studying rehabilitation theories of punishment
and indeterminate sentencing, 70 Congress decided to reform the
federal sentencing system. 7 1 A Congressional study disclosed disparate sentencing practices for similarly situated defendants among
66. See 132 CONG. REc. S13,974 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Biden) ("One of the problems is we put these people in jail and we say we want to
help them. Really we are helping ourselves.... [They must be] placed in treatment programs under close supervision to prevent their return to illicit drugs and
crime.").
67. 132 CONG. REc. H6555 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Wolpe).
68. See 134 CONG. REc. H7071 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Weiss) ("Drug related crimes are escalating ....
The urgency of finding solutions
cannot be overstated."); 132 CONG. REc. S12,216 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("Why shouldn't these people be put in the penitentiary? ...
As far as I am concerned, they could rot there. Why shed a tear if they are sentenced to life?").
69. 132 CONG. Rc. S12,216 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Byrd).
70. In the early 1970s, the primary sentencing consideration was the provision
of skills necessary to prevent recidivism. Individual offender characteristics were
essential to the sentencing determination and judges had wide discretion in recommending incarceration or probation. If incarcerated, the U.S. Parole Commission could exercise further discretion in determining the time served by an
offender. The Commission, however, was limited by two factors: the maximum
sentence imposed and the statutory requirement that parole eligibility was considered only after an offender had served one-third of the imposed sentence. However, the recidivism rate did not decrease. Critics attacked the discretion given to
judges and to the Parole Commission, and the resulting disparities in the sentencing imposed and served for similar offenses. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE,
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 11-18 (1986).
71. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1983).
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federal judges. It also disclosed that judges considered the United
States Parole Commission's probable release date for a defendant
when imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 72 Congress concluded
that (1) the discretion givenjudges and the Parole Commission undermined public confidence in the criminal justice system, and (2)
the certainty of punishment no longer served effectively to deter
crime. 73 Congress also decided that recidivism could not decrease
if offenders and the public viewed the sentencing system as unwar74
ranted, unfair and unjust.

Congress' response - the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) - fundamentally altered the nation's sentencing goals
and practices. The Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission
rejected the sentencing flexibility inherent in the rehabilitative theory of punishment and embraced the shift toward deterrence and
incapacitation as the primary purposes of punishment. 75 Deterrence (through certainty and severity) and incapacitation, rather
than rehabilitation, were thus the goals of the new federal sentencing system. 7 6 These goals 7 7 would be accomplished through deter72. Id. at 41-46.
73. Id. at 38.
74. See generally Federal Criminal Law Revision, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 944 (1982); Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part 2: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1670 (1979).
75. The purposes of sentencing, as stated in the Sentencing Reform Act,
were: (1) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law
and to provide just punishment; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; (3) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to
provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) (1988).
76. Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, sponsored an
earlier sentencing reform bill and noted that "experience does indicate that we
must abandon the comforting but unrealistic notion that rehabilitation of the convicted criminal can serve as ajustification for imposing a prison sentence or determine the length of incarceration." Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of
CriminalSentencing: Law With Order, 16 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 353, 366 (1979).
77. These goals do not accurately reflect the concerns raised during the debates on the Sentencing Reform Act. It was generally assumed that severe punishment was an effective deterrent, but some policymakers argued that increasing the
severity of a punishment would not significantly change the deterrent effect of the
punishment. When the deterrent effect of harsher punishment was questioned,
others argued that incapacitation alone was sufficient to justify more severe criminal sanctions. FederalSentencing Revision, 1984: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 734-35
(testimony of Professor M. Kay Harris); see id. at 1182 (testimony of Alvin Bronstein) (1984).
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minate sentencing 78 effected in compulsory sentencing guidelines
established by the Commission, 79 and the abolishment of parole.
The Guidelines" ° were specifically intended to limit judicial
discretion so that defendants convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances would receive similar sentences.8 1 They established the acceptable range of appropriate punishment for any
given crime, but leave the actual sentence to the discretion of the
82
trial judge.
The Guidelines have been subjected to intense analysis and debate. 83 Proponents contend that the Guidelines have been effective
in accomplishing their major goals - uniformity and certainty in
sentencing and reducing sentencing disparity. 84 Critics claim that
the Guidelines have adversely affected the criminal justice system,
have not effectively reduced sentencing disparity, have not met
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). Congress had rejected strict determinate
sentencing, but the Sentencing Commission believed determinate sentencing was
necessary to eliminate sentencing disparity. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr. &John
R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstoneof the FederalSentencing Guidelines,41 S.C.
L. REv. 495 (1990).
79. Minnesota adopted the first sentencing guidelines in 1978. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 244, I-V (Appendix) (West 1993). Many commentators cite the Minnesota guidelines as one of the most effective sentencing guidelines in the country.
See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, the Sentencing Commission & Other
Officials Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WArE FOREST L. REv. 345, 36466 (1993); Michael Tonry, The Success ofJudge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 713, 717-20 (1993); Andrew von Hirsch & Judith Greene, When
Should Reformers Support Creation of Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
329 (1993).
80. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, at 1. The Sentencing Guidelines were established
to "further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment, and rehabilitation." Id.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988).
82. The Guidelines must "provide certainty and fairness on meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences." Id. Arguably, the
Guidelines do not realistically preserve the judge's discretionary function because
the maximum allowable range (assuming the judge may not deviate) is six months.
83. Analyses of the effectiveness of the Guidelines have been conducted by
the Sentencing Commission and other federal agencies. See, e.g., GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMI-ITEES, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAINED UNANSWERED (1992) [hereinafter G.A.O.
REPORT]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA

BARGAINING (1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. REPORT].
84. See U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 83, at 269; GA.O. REPORT, supra note 83,

at 13; Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1077 (1992) (arguing that sentencing guidelines are best way
to achieve proportionality and uniformity in sentencing of criminal offenders);
William W. Wilkins, Jr. &John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing GuidelineAmendments
in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 63, 87 (1993).
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their stated goal of certainty, have granted unfettered discretion to
the executive branch and have mandated disproportionately severe
sentences. 85 Federal judges, probation officers, the American Bar
Association, the General Accounting Office, defense attorneys and
the Federal Courts Study Committee have criticized the Guidelines.
They argue that the Guidelines create more problems than they
86
resolve.
The provisions subjected to the most intense criticism are the
substantial assistance, the obstruction ofjustice, and the acceptance
of responsibility prerequisites. 87 Opponents claim that these provisions have detrimental effects on sentences for minor offenders, on
the right to testify on one's own behalf and on a defendant's right
against self-incrimination. Criticism generally applicable to drug
offenses has been directed at the mandatory minimums, the substantial assistance provision and the determination of the weight of
a drug which includes "mixture or substance" or the carrier agent.
The most frequent criticism, however, involves the mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenders. 88 When the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 was enacted, Congress was surely aware that federal sentencing guidelines were being developed. Congress may
have also been aware that the Senate Report accompanying the bill
85. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines,58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 901 (1991); DanielJ. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1741-47 (1992);
Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRiM.
L. REv. 771, 774 (1992); Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The FederalSentencing Guidelines'
Failureto Eliminate SentencingDisparity: GovernmentalManipulationsBefore Arrest 1993
Wis. L. REv. 187 (arguing that unequal treatment under Guidelines, which allows
prosecutors to manipulate prison terms, leads to disparate sentences and violates
Congressional goals and public policy); William J. Kirchner, Note, PunishmentDespite Acquittal: An UnconstitutionalAspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARiz.
L. REv. 799 (1992) (analyzing question of whether offender's sentence should be
increased on basis of conduct for which offender has been acquitted). For more
information about the federal sentencing guidelines, see Symposium, Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99 (1992); Symposium, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681
(1992); Symposium, Making Sense of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAviS
L. REv. 563 (1992); Symposium, RevisitingDisparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771 (1992).
86. See generallyJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990);
GA.O. REPORT, supra note 83.
87. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to Authorities);
id. § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice); id. § 3E1.1
(Acceptance of Responsibility).
88. For an analysis of mandatory minimum sentences, see UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM].
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that became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and that established the Sentencing Commission, stated: "[T] he [Congressional]
Committee generally looks with disfavor on statutory minimum
sentences of imprisonment, since their inflexibility occasionally results in too harsh an application of the law and often results in detrimental circumvention of the laws." 8 9 Congress nevertheless
enacted mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the 1986 Act
and restricted the Commission's discretion in establishing sentencing guidelines for drug offenses. 90
The Commission calculated the guideline ranges for narcotics
violations using the statutory minimum penalties in section 841 of
the 1986 Act. 91 However, some guideline sentencing ranges exceeded the mandatory minimums in the 1986 Act, and some currently exceed the minimums in the 1988 Act. Therefore, some
drug offenders are sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences
which are higher than the mandatory minimums in either Act.
3.

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(1994 Crime Bill) 9 2 significantly increases the penalties for and expands the use of mandatory minimums for drug-defined and drugrelated offenses. 93 The 1994 Crime Bill also establishes new of94
fenses, authorizes capital punishment for several new offenses,
89. S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 n.194 (1983).
90. Currently, there are over 100 federal mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions in 60 criminal statutes. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 88, at 8-10. However, only four of the 60 criminal
offense statutes with mandatory minimum provisions result in frequent convictions, and these four prohibit only drug and weapons offenses. Id.
91. U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 2DI.1, cmt. n.10 ("The Commission has used
the sentences provided in, and equivalencies derived from, the statute (21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) (1)) as the primary basis for the guideline sentences.").
92. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 and in
scattered sections of U.S.C.). All references in this Article to the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 will be referred to by the bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
93. See H.R. 3355, § 320107 (increasing penalties for drug trafficking near
public housing) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 860); id. §§ 90101-90208 (amending various sections of U.S.C.).
94. Title VI of the Crime Bill is given the title, "Federal Death Penalty Act of
1994." It authorizes the death penalty not only for offenses such as murder, H.R.
3355, §60003(a)(4) (amending 18 U.S.C. §1111(b)); and espionage, id.
§ 60003(a)(2) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)); but also for wrecking trains, id.
§ 60003(a) (8) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1992); hostage taking, id. § 60003(a) (10)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a)); carjacking, id. § 60003(a)(14) (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2119(3)); sexual exploitation of children, id. § 60011 (amending 18
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and for the first time, emphasizes alternative punishments, prevention, treatment, and flexibility in the application of mandatory
minimums for some drug offenses. 95 In addition, the 1994 Crime
Bill provides funds for prison construction, places new limits on the
role of federal courts in overseeing prison conditions and includes
a racial justice provision aimed at eliminating racial discrimination
96
in the imposition of the death penalty.
One of the most controversial sections of the 1994 Crime Bill is
9 7 It
the "three-strikes-you're-out" or "three time loser" provision.
mandates life imprisonment without release for an offender convicted of a federal offense, if the offender had two prior state or
federal court convictions for qualifying offenses. These offenses
either must both be violent felonies or must be one violent felony
and one serious drug offense.
When the provision reached the House floor for debate, drug
felonies could not count as one of the two prior convictions. Viewing the nation's drug problem as significant a problem as violent
crime, the House rejected the provision limiting section 70001
(then known as section 2408) only to violent offenses, and instead
approved an amendment allowing "serious" drug felonies to count
as any or all of the "three-strikes" offenses. 98
U.S.C. § 2251(c)); violence against maritime navigation, id. § 60019 (amending 18
U.S.C. §§ 2280-2281; and torture, id. § 60020 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a)).
95. See H.R. 3355, § 80001 (Limitation on Applicability of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in Certain Cases) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553). For further discussion of the ability of judges to deviate from mandatory minimums, see infra notes
107-09 and accompanying text.
96. See id. § 60002 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c) (2) (A)) ("Whenever the court
of appeals finds that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor ... the court shall remand the
case.").
97. See id. §§ 70001-70002 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559, 3582(c)(1)(A))
(Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Persons Convicted of Certain Felonies). The
1994 Crime Bill provides in part:
(c) IMPRISONMENT OF CERTAIN VIOLENT FELONS.

-

(1) MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in
a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced
to life imprisonment if (A) the person has been convicted.., on separate prior occasions
in a court of the United States or of a State of (i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or
(ii) one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious
drug offenses ....
Id. § 70001 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3559); see also id. § 60002 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3592(c) (10)) (adding two or more prior felonies to list of aggravating factors in
death penalty cases).
98. See House Passes Crime Bil4 RacialJustice Provisions Stay, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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The Sentencing Commission criticized this "three-strikes" provision. The Commission stated that the provision could lead to unwarranted disparity in sentencing similar defendants and
unwarranted uniformity in sentencing non-similar defendants. 99
Currently, there are wide variations among states and within the
federal system on the maximum statutory penalties assigned to
criminal conduct of comparable severity. There are also differences in the manner in which prosecutorial discretion is exercised
with respect to charging the current offense and qualifying predicatory offenses. These variations and differences would result in disparity in the treatment of otherwise similarly-situated offenders. At
the same time, the "three-strikes" provision would produce uniformity in sentencing for very dissimilar offenders because of the
broad definition of violent crimes. The Commission had a number
of other objections to the "three-strikes" provision, noting that its
application would have a disproportionate impact on nativeAmericans convicted of committing crimes on federal lands and would
result in the inclusion of "one time" offenders because one criminal
episode could result in three qualifying convictions, and thereby
defeat the purpose of punishing "three-time" offenders. The Commission recommended that the provision be deleted from the final
statute, or that, if included, be made "more compatible" with the
goals of the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act.
The 1994 Crime Bill also includes a number of new mandatory
minimum provisions for crimes which involve guns. It enhances
penalties for "crimes of violence" and "drug trafficking crimes" if
the crime is committed while using a semiautomatic firearm.' 0 0
This provision "federalizes" many state crimes, such as armed robberies, and may create confusion between investigative authorities.
The provision may also result in disparate sentencing. Defendants who are not similarly situated, either in the commission of the
underlying state offense, or in the conduct which constitutes "pos(Pace Publications), Apr. 18, 1994, at 1-2 (discussing expansion of
"three strikes" provision).
99. Sentencing Commission Issues Critical Analysis of Proposed Federal Crime Bill,
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 54, at 1513 (Mar. 2, 1994). In a February 22, 1994, analysis of the Crime Bill, the Commission also noted that the Guidelines already include a life imprisonment sanction for violent offenders and drug offenders.
Guidelines Sections 4B1.1 and 1.2 are conceptually similar to the three strikes provision, "except that instead of a mandatory life sentence ... in every case, regardless of the degree of seriousness, the guidelines require sentencing at or near the
maximum penalty Congress has authorized for the violent or drug offenses the
defendant has recently committed." Id.
100. H.R. 3355, § 110501 (directing United States Sentencing Commission to
amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
NEWSLETTER
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session of the firearm," would receive the same enhancement.
Moreover, prosecutions under the provision would increase the demands on an already overburdened federal criminal justice system.
Convictions under section 110501 would increase the overall average of sentences served in the federal system from 3.7 years to 6.8
years, and increase the total federal prison population by 383.9%
over a nine-year period.'0 1
Another new provision triples the punishment for drug traffickers over twenty-one years of age who sell to or use minors in
their crimes.10 2 The 1994 Crime Bill also authorizes the death penalty for gun murders during federal drug trafficking crimes '03 and
for drive-by shootings committed to further a drug conspiracy, if
104
the drive-by shooting results in a first-degree murder.
The 1994 Crime Bill continues the trend of increasing the penalties for possession and distribution of drugs. As stated above, it
triples the maximum punishment normally available under the
Controlled Substances Act for anyone who employs or persuades a
person under eighteen to distribute drugs near schools and playgrounds. It directs the Sentencing Commission to "appropriately
enhance" the penalty for a person convicted of both simple possession and smuggling, distribution or intended distribution of a controlled substance within a federal prison or federal detention
facility. 10 5 It also provides that any sentence for drug trafficking
within a prison will be consecutive to any other sentence for an
offense involving a controlled substance. 10 6
The 1994 Crime Bill also includes a provision which will allow
some defendants to escape mandatory minimums.10 7 A judge can
ignore a mandatory minimum if the following criteria exist: (1) the
defendant has no more than one criminal history point; (2) the
defendant did not use violence or carry a firearm; (3) the offense
did not result in death or serious bodily injury; (4) the defendant
101. Sentencing Commission Issues CriticalAnalysis of Proposed Federal Crime Bil
supra note 99, at 1514.
102. H.R. 3355, § 140006 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 860). The 1994 Crime Bill
also enhances penalties for soliciting a minor to commit a crime. Id. § 140008.
This provision received wide support in Congress. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC.
S14,908-02 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Gramm) ("[T]hese hoodlums who use children to deliver their drugs ought to face a stiff minimum
mandatory sentence without parole for involving a child in a drug conspiracy.").
103. H.R. 3355, § 60013 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 924).
104. Id. § 60008 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 36).
105. Id. § 90101 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1791).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 80001 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
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was not an organizer or leader; and (5) the defendant fully cooperated with the government. 10 8 The sentencing judge could impose a
sentence consistent with the Guidelines and unrestrained by the
otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum.1 0 9
The 1994 Crime Bill also authorizes funding for several innovative programs, making it somewhat more balanced than prior crime
bills. It provides grants for juvenile drug trafficking and gang prevention programs; community coalitions to combat substance
abuse; and programs for drug testing upon arrest, pre-trial, or post
conviction. 10 It also authorizes grants to develop and implement
substance abuse treatment programs for prisoners within state correctional facilities. 1 ' It mandates residential substance abuse treatment in federal prisons "subject to the availability of
appropriations."" 2 The treatment will be phased in over the next
three years, with treatment capacity for 50% of eligible prisoners by
the end of fiscal year 1995, 75% by the end of fiscal year 1996, and
100% by the end of fiscal year 1997.113 As an incentive to participation, prisoners will be offered a possible reduction in sentence of
4
up to one year following successful completion of treatment."
The 1994 Crime Bill also makes drug testing a condition of release
for federal prisoners.
In addition, the 1994 Crime Bill authorizes grants to the states
for boot camps and other alternative punishment methods (such as
community-based incarceration, weekend incarceration and electronic monitoring) for young, non-violent offenders." 5 It also authorizes grants for states to construct and to operate low-to-medium
security prisons, local detention facilities and prisons for violent
drug offenders. 116 Grants are also authorized for "drug court" programs with continuing judicial supervision over specific categories
of persons with substance abuse problems." 7 These programs involve the integrated administration of sanctions and services including drug testing, substance abuse treatment, community diversion,
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. §§ 30101-32401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13741-13921).
111. Id. § 32001 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3621).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 20101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 50001 (amending Title I of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3711).
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probation, supervised release, aftercare (programmatic or health
related), and incarceration based on noncompliance.
With the 1994 Crime Bill, Congress intended to provide "the
necessary weapons to combat drug dealers." 118 The majority of
these weapons, however, like the weapons provided by earlier bills,
are more severe penal sanctions for convicted defendants.1 19
B. JudicialResponse
The Supreme Court has neither endorsed nor advocated a specific theory of punishment for drug offenders. The Court has, however, upheld the Federal Sentencing Guidelines1 20 and validated
12 1
the mandatory minimum penalties in the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts.
The Court's more recent pronouncements affect its role in interpreting any constitutional limitations on the lengthy incarceration
sentences imposed on drug offenders. In a 1991 decision on excessive imprisonment and proportionality, Harmelin v. Michigan,12 2 the
Court deferred to the punishment method adopted by the state for
drug offenses, and embraced the incarceration addiction.
Ronald Harmelin, a first time offender, was convicted in a
Michigan state court of possessing 672.5 grams of cocaine. He was
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 12 3 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of his sen118. 140

CONG.

Ric. H2591 (daily ed. April 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.

Bishop).
119. Congress had such an anti-crime agenda in 1994 that, according to Senator Biden of Delaware, "[i]f someone proposed barbwiring the ankles of anyone
who jaywalks, I think it would pass." Helen Dewar, New Penalties' Scope Would be
Limited: Few Violent Crimes Go to Federal Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1993, at A22.
However, virtually all violent crimes and the other non-drug crimes are tried in
state courts, where federal penalties do not apply. Only about one-tenth of one
percent of violent crimes have been tried in federal court. Id. Nevertheless, given
the political climate, Congress was compelled to increase federal penalties for violent crime.
120. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 constitutional, reasoning that sentencing guidelines are
neither impermissible delegation of legislative authority nor violation of separation of powers principle); see alsoJulia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionalityof Federal
Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United
States, 75 IowA L. REV. 767, 768 (1990); Mark Nielsen, Mistretta v. United States
and the Eroding Separationof Powers, 12 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1049 (1989).
121. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467-78 (1991) (holding
mandatory minimum statute not unconstitutionally vague and mandatory minimum sentences based on weight of LSD mixture which includes carrier medium
not violative of Due Process Clause); see Michelle Rome Kallam, Note, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 52 LA. L. REv. 1267 (1992).
122. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
123. Id. at 961. Harmelin's conviction was initially reversed and remanded by
the Michigan Court of Appeals on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. This appel-
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tence, rejecting an attack based on the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
12 4
and Unusual Punishment Clause.
While the vote of the Court was five to four, the Harmelin decision had a curiously structured framework. The Justices could not
reach a majority opinion. There were three separate opinions on
the constitutional issue and the principal dissenting opinion had
the largest plurality. Justice Scalia authored the decision of the five
Justice majority, but only the Chief Justice concurred with his opinion. Justice Kennedy authored the concurring opinion, which
agreed only with Justice Scalia's result. Two Justices agreed with
Justice Kennedy's analysis, but three Justices joined in the principal
dissenting opinion, authored by Justice White.
Two Eighth Amendment issues were before the Court:
whether the sentencer must consider mitigating circumstances
when imposing a mandatory life without parole sentence, and
whether Mr. Harmelin's sentence was disproportionate to his drug
possession offense.1 25 The Scalia and Kennedy opinions concluded
that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause did not guarantee individualized consideration of mitigating
circumstances in non-capital cases, even if first time drug offenders,
convicted of possession, must be sentenced to life without parole.
According to Justice Scalia, this mandatory punishment is justifiable, because it is not unusual, even if cruel. 126 Justice Kennedy
claimed that the punishment was justifiable because the state legislature had the authority to establish it and because it served one of
12 7
"the first purposes of criminal law - deterrence."
The punishment goal of deterrence and its relationship to the
late opinion was vacated by the Michigan Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
later affirmed the conviction. Harmelin's application to appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court was summarily denied. Id.
124. Id. at 996.
125. Id. at 961-62.
126. Justice Scalia, in a detailed analysis, reviewed the historical context of the
framing of the Bill of Rights and of the Eighth Amendment. He noted that the
framers of the Constitution adopted verbatim the cruel and unusual punishment
language from the English Bill of Rights. See id. at 975-85. "The Eighth Amendment was based on Article 1, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the
English Bill of Rights." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983). Scalia then
strictly construed the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
only to prohibit punishment that the Constitution's Framers thought was both
cruel and unusual. Id. at 984-85. Life imprisonment without parole was not an
unusual penalty in the penal codes of early America, and mandatory imprisonment was not an unusual punishment. Therefore, Mr. Harmelin's sentence did
not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at 994-95.
127. Harmelin,501 U.S. at 1007-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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"drug war" also justified the majority's conclusion that Mr. Harmelin's life sentence was proportionate to his offense. Justice Scalia
rejected any constitutional proportionality principle because the
Framers did not intend to incorporate a proportionality principle
into the Eighth Amendment. He also found that:
the standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality
principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective
values. This becomes clear, we think, from a consideration of the three factors.., relevant to the proportionality
determination: (1) the inherent gravity of the offense, (2)
the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the
same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same
1 28
crime in other jurisdictions.
As to the gravity of a drug possession offense, Scalia claimed only
that the state legislature could determine "how odious and socially
threatening one believes drug use to be."1 29 When comparing the
life sentence for drug possession to the penalty for other offenses,
Scalia rationalized that the deterrent effect of lengthy incarceration
may justify a disproportionate sentence.1 3 0 Justice Scalia added,
"[f] or example, since deterrent effect depends not only upon the
amount of the penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less
grave but significantly more difficult to detect may warrant substan13 1
tially higher penalties."
Justice Kennedy recognized that a proportionality requirement
had existed in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for
the last eighty years, but that the application of the requirement was
limited by four principles: (1) setting prison terms for crimes is exclusively a function of the legislature; (2) the Eighth Amendment
does not require adoption of any one penological theory (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation); (3) differences
in sentencing theory and constitutional sentences are "the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure;" and (4) proportionality review by federal courts should be informed, to the
132
maximum extent possible, by objective factors.
128. Id. at 986-87 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91).
129. Id. at 988 ("But surely whether it is a 'grave' offense merely to possess a
significant quantity of drugs - thereby facilitating distribution, subjecting the
holder to the temptation of distribution, and raising the possibility of theft by
others who might distribute - depends entirely upon how odious and socially
threatening one believes drug use to be.").
130. Id. at 988-89.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Based on these principles, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between
offense and punishment, but prohibits only extreme penal sanctions that are grossly disproportionate. Justice Kennedy then found
that Mr. Harmelin's life sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate because the Michigan legislature could have rationally
decided that drug possession "threatened to cause grave harm to
133
society" and warranted a mandatory severe penalty.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a mandatory life
sentence "gave force to one of the first purposes" of criminal law deterrence, and specifically invoked deterrence and retribution as
appropriate legislative motivations.' 3 4 He emphasized "the pernicious effects of the drug epidemic" and the "direct nexus between
illegal drugs and crimes of violence." 135 Although there was no
evidence that Mr. Harmelin had engaged in any violent conduct or
had ever sold or distributed drugs, Justice Kennedy noted the harm
caused by a "professional seller of addictive drugs" and concluded
that his crime may be "as serious and violent as the crime of felony
13 6
murder."
Justices White and Stevens, in dissenting opinions, challenged
the unrestricted application of the deterrent and retributive functions of punishment. 3 7 They concluded that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement placed constitutional limits on
state sentencing decisions. Justice White concluded that Mr.
Harmelin's sentence was disproportionately severe because the "absolute magnitude" of the drug possession offense was not "exceptionally serious," the sentence was the harshest available under
Michigan law (because Michigan had no death penalty), and no
other jurisdiction imposed such a severe punishment for his
crime. 13 8 As Justice White stated, "the fact that a punishment has
been legislatively mandated does not automatically render it 'legal'
or 'usual' in the constitutional sense .... [I]f this were the case,
133. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
134. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The Michigan Legislature could within
reason conclude that the threat posed to... society by possession of this large an
amount of cocaine - in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement - is
momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence
without-parole." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Marshall concurred withJustice White, "except insofar as it asserts
that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not
proscribe the death penalty." Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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then the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments would
13 9
be devoid of any meaning."'
Justice Stevens argued that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is similar to the death penalty, because the offender will never regain freedom. 140 Because
the sentence does not serve a rehabilitative function, it rests on a
determination that the punished criminal conduct is so atrocious
that society's interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator. Justice Stevens then found the notion that Mr. Harmelin's
punishment satisfies any meaningful formulation of proportionality
14 1
was itself both cruel and unusual.
The essential issue for analysis is whether lengthy or mandatory
imprisonment terms for all drug offenses is constitutional. In other
words, did Mr. Harmelin's mandatory life sentence violate the
Eighth Amendment because it was disproportionate to his crime of
possessing cocaine? Justices Scalia and Rehnquist found the sentence constitutional because the Eighth Amendment contained no
proportionality guarantee. The Justice Kennedy group found that
the Eighth Amendment contained only a "gross" proportionality
guarantee, but that there was no "gross" disproportionality between
the sentence and Mr. Harmelin's drug crime.
Justice Scalia stated that the Framers did not intend to include
a proportionality guarantee in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 42 Other state constitutions had explicit proportionality guarantees, and the Framers
would have explicitly stated such a guarantee in the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the cruel and unusual punishments clause was
based on the Framers' interpretation of the English Bill of Rights
43
which only prohibited certain modes of punishment.
Justice Scalia's conclusion is questionable because scholars
139. Id. at 1016-17 (White, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice White explained, "[t] he mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 'is the most severe punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime,' for Michigan has no death penalty." Id. at 1022 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983)).
141. Id. at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 985 ("[T]hose who framed and approved the Federal Constitution
chose, for whatever reason, not to include within it the guarantee against disproportionate sentences.").
143. After deciding that the Eighth Amendment had no prohibition against
excessive punishment, Justice Scalia found that it only contained a proportionality
guarantee for the death penalty. Id. at 968-69.
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continue to disagree on the exact prohibitions in the English Bill of
Rights. 144 Moreover, even if there were no dispute about the historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment and Justice Scalia's views
were correct, his conclusion that the Amendment is confined only
to the modes of punishment ignores the evolving meaning given
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause by the Court.
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality guarantee. In Weems v. United
States,' 45 the Court recognized that a comparative analysis is necessary to determine whether a punishment, deemed unusual, violates
the Eighth Amendment.1 46 After Weems, the Court extended the
1 47
Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee to capital cases,
14
to discretionary life sentences without parole,'

and to fines. 149

Justice Scalia claimed that Solem v. Helm,' 50 which held that the
Eighth Amendment implicitly forbids disproportionate sentences
of imprisonment, was "simply wrong."151 He argued that Solem violated the essence of federalism and the constitutional separation of
powers doctrine.' 52 The judicial branch could not review criminal
sanctions because: (1) the Framers intended sentence proportion144. See Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel & Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The

OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL.L. REv. 839, 860, 862-65 (1969) ("The English evidence

shows that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689
was . . .a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties.").
Justice Scalia argued that the actual meaning of the English Bill of Rights is not
relevant, because the correct interpretation of the Eighth Amendment depends on
the Framers' intent, regardless of whether the Framers correctly interpreted the
English Bill of Rights. Indeed, Scalia agrees with the commentators who conclude
the Framers misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979.
145. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
146. Id. at 380-82. The Court held that prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments was directed at barbaric punishment and "all punishments which, by
their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offense
charged." Id. at 366-67, 371. The defendant in Weems was sentenced to "cadena
temporal" or 15 years imprisonment at hard labor, for falsifying a public and official document. The Court suggested incarceration for a "long term of years might
be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 368.
147. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
148. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court noted that
although the "precise scope of this provision [the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause] is uncertain, it at least incorporated the 'longstanding principle of English
law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length or
severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged.' " Id. at 285 (quoting R.
PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (1959)).
149. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993).
150. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
151. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
152. Id. at 986-90.
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ality issues to be resolved by the legislature, and (2) there was no
objective way to test the gravity of a crime against the severity of a
punishment. Justice Scalia's analysis would thus preclude judicial
15 3
review of the excessiveness of any non-capital sentence.
While Justice Scalia found that precedent was "simply wrong,"
Justice Kennedy analyzed and tried to distinguish the Court's prior
proportionality cases. Kennedy examined the three comparisons
set forth in Solem for reviewing sentence proportionality issues: (1)
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and
(3) the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions. 15 4 He then found that the "intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional analyses [in (2) and (3) above] are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference
of gross disproportionality." 155 The second and third analyses in
the Solem test would only supplement the first comparison, or "validate an initial judgement that a sentence is grossly disproportionate."1 5 6 Justice Kennedy thus established a "narrow proportionality
principle" that limits the three-part Solem test to one analysis: the
judicial balancing of the gravity of the offense against the severity of
the punishment. 15 7 If this balancing reveals gross disproportionality, the comparative analysis may support a violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. However, the guarantee only
prohibits a sentence that is "extreme" and " 'grossly disproportion58
ate' to the crime."1
Justice Kennedy then ignored the circumstances relevant to
Mr. Harmelin's case and examined the crime and punishment in
the abstract. He found there could have been a reasonable basis to
believe that cocaine possession was a sufficiently dangerous crime
to warrant mandatory life imprisonment without parole. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy equated possession with distri153. Justice Scalia argued that capital cases are unique, because they are part
of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence, which should not be extended to
non-capital cases. Id. at 994.
154. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983). In determining the gravity
of the offense, the Court noted the following relevant factors: the harm to the
victim or society, the culpability of the offender, and the absolute magnitude of the
crime. Id. at 292-93.
155. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 996-1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

158. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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bution and violent crimes. The "absolute magnitude" of possession
was blurred with "the pernicious effects of the drug epidemic."
The "drug" crime was thus sufficiently grave, and the Michigan
state legislature was not unreasonable in enacting the mandatory
life penalty. Mr. Harmelin's sentence was within constitutional
bounds and it was unnecessary for the Court to apply the jurisdictional analyses. 15 9 In sum, Justice Kennedy used arguably irrational
facts and the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of
Mr. Harmelin's punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 160 He,
too, embraced the addiction.
The dissenting Justices found that there was a proportionality
guarantee in the Eighth Amendment, relying on prior capital and
non-capital cases. Justice White noted thatJustice Scalia's abandonment of judicial review of sentences was contrary to Marbuty v.
Madison's proclamation that it "is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."161 Justice
White embraced the three objective factors in Solem, and found that
"reviewing courts have not baldly substituted their own subjective
values for those of the legislature." 1 62 He then applied the Solem
test and concluded that Mr. Harmelin's sentence for drug possession was unconstitutional.
The five Justices who comprise the Harmelinmajority essentially
eliminated any judicial review of legislatively-mandated prison
sentences. Justice Kennedy concluded that legislative decisions
about the punishment for criminal offenses are, "as a general matter, . . . 'properly within the province of legislatures, not
courts.' ',163 Justice Scalia claimed that criminal sentences are solely
within the legislature's prerogative and courts should not intrude
64
into the area.'
Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority's legislative deference argument would validate the imposition of mandatory life
sentences for petty violations. "Harmelin provides no mechanism
for overcoming the presumption of constitutionality, but instead of159. Id. at 1008-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. In this respect, justice Kennedy's proportionality review in Harmelin resembles the "minimum rationality" test applicable to other areas of constitutional
law. See, e.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
161. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
162. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015-16 (White, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 998 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980))
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 986-87.
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fers empty reassurances that these extreme cases will never occur." 165 These extreme cases will occur because legislatures have
and will enact reactionary or extremist statutes, which are more
likely to be enacted in response to public demands to resolve the
drug problem. 16 6 Judicial review is essential to guard against punishment which, when enacted to advance a political agenda, may be
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Scalia and Kennedy opinions
preclude drug defendants from challenging the severity of any noncapital sentence in federal court. By over-emphasizing deference to
legislators, the Harmelin Court lost sight of one crucial issue: the
judiciary remains the gate-keeper of individual rights, even if those
rights are possessed by drug offenders. 16 7
The "pernicious effects of the drug epidemic," to borrow Kennedy's phrase, cannot be disputed. It is obviously imperative to
deal with drug offenders harshly. However, it is also imperative to
deal with them in a manner that effectively addresses the drug epidemic, and which protects the rights embodied in the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 168 The drug
epidemic, which includes violence, crime and social displacement,
cannot validate every term of imprisonment imposed on every drug
offender.
The Harmelin Court did more than declare mandatory life imprisonment without parole a proportional punishment for a first
time offender convicted of drug possession. Itjoined the legislative
and executive "incarceration addicts." The need to resolve the
drug problem has now eliminated judicial review of criminal penalties, and the Eighth Amendment, another casualty in the drug war,
is no longer a "brake on the mass hysteria" accompanying the drug
165. Andrew H. Mun, MandatoryLife Sentence Without ParoleFound Constitutionally Permissiblefor Cocaine Possession, 67 WASH. L. REV. 713, 727 (1992).
166. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 439 U.S. 1091, 1097 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that punishments for drug crimes are set too high because legislatures focus "on the corrosive social impact of drug trafficking in general, rather
than on [defendants'] actual ... involvement in that enterprise").
167. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910). Appellate courts
may now affirm incarceration sentences based on the severity of the general "crime
problem." Indeed, after Harmelin, courts have affirmed harsh sentences for drug
crimes and for crimes deemed to be as serious as Mr. Harmelin's drug possession
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1517-18 (8th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Van
Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d
1106 (3d Cir. 1991).
168. 'Judicial enforcement of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking
the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for
crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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IV.

THE FAILURE OF INCARCERATION

The consequences of the incarceration addiction are self-evident. The United States Government now incarcerates more persons than any other country. 170 The federal and state prison
population doubled within the last ten years, 71 and drug offenders
bore the brunt of this increase. Drug offenders occupy sixty-one
percent of the beds in federal prison.' 72 Drug offenders also constituted an estimated twenty-two percent of the state prison population in 1991, up from six percent of the population in 1979.173
As a consequence of the 1986 and 1988 Acts and the Guidelines, the number of drug offenders convicted in federal courts has
more than tripled, while the number of non-drug convictions in169. Kathleen Vandy, Note, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 883, 902 (1993) ("By refusing to
void Harmelin's sentence the Court rejected the use of the Eighth Amendment as
a brake on mass hysteria.").
170. MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A
COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF INCARCERATION 3 (1991). In 1990, the
per capita incarceration rate in the United States was 455 per 100,000 while in
South Africa, it was 311 per 100,000. Id. Our rate jumped 6.8% in 1990, while
South Africa's fell 6.6% Id. The Sentencing Project's 1992 report did not include
statistics from what was once the Soviet Union because reliable statistics were unavailable after its demise. In the 1991 report, however, the Sentencing Project
reported per capita incarceration rates of 426 per 100,000 for the United States,
333 per 100,000 for South Africa, and 268 per 100,000 for the Soviet Union. Id.
Further, Elliott Currie noted the following rates:
At the beginning of the 1980s, the incarceration rate in the United States
was about 217 per 100,000. At the opposite extreme, the Dutch rate was
about 21 per 100,000. In between were the world's industrial societies,
many clustered towards the lower end of the scale: Japan's rate was 44
per 100,000, Norway's 45, Sweden's 55, West Germany's 60, Denmark's
63, France's 67, and Great Britain's relatively high 80 per 100,000.
Elliott Currie, Crime and the Conservatives: How Their Analyses Miss the Problem, 32
DISSENT 427, 429-30 (1981) (citing EUGENE DoLuscHAL & ANNE NEWTON, INTERNATIONAL RATES OF IMPRISONMENT (1981)).

171. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1990, supra note 21, at 604.
In 1972, the prison incarceration rate (per capita imprisonment rate) was 93 prisoners per 100,000 population, or 196,092 prisoners, and in 1990, the rate was 293
prisoners per 100,000 population, or 771,243 prisoners. In addition, an average of
386,845 people were in jail on any given day during the year preceding June 30,
1990. Id.; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 1990, at 1, 2 (1991); BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE,
JAIL INMATES 1989, at 1 (1990).
172. Jill Smolowe, And Throw Away the Key, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 55-56. Additionally, the state and federal prison population increased from 329,821 in 1980 to
823,414 in 1991, and the local jail population increased from 209,582 in 1982 to
426,479 in 1991. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 5-6 (1993).
173. Id.
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creased by only thirty-two percent between 1980 and 1990.174 In

addition, the number of drug offenders sentenced to incarceration
has almost doubled.1 75 The proportion of convicted offenders sentenced to incarceration for drug crimes also rose over this period, 176 and the likelihood of imprisonment for drug offenders
increased from seventy-seven percent in 1980 to ninety-one percent
in 1990.177

Moreover, the average sentence imposed and the sentences actually served by convicted drug offenders increased dramatically.
The average sentence imposed was forty-seven months in 1980, and
eighty-one months in 1990. Drug offenders released from federal
prison in 1986 served an average of twenty-two months. Drug offenders sentenced under the Guidelines during 1990 were expected to serve at least sixty-six months, but only if they earn good
time credits for good behavior. 178 Although the average length of
imposed prison sentences increased for drug crimes, this average
decreased substantially for all other crimes. 179 The sentence actually imposed for crimes should be an indication of the harm caused
by the offender. Thus, the relative harm caused by drug offenders
has now been elevated above that of almost every other type of
crime.
Has this incarceration strategy been effective? Has incarceration enhanced public safety? Have long periods of incarceration
174. BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REFEDERAL SENTENCING IN TRANSITION 1986-90, at 2-4 (1991) [hereinafter SENTENCING IN TRANSrION]. The number of persons convicted of violating federal
drug laws rose to 16,311 in 1990 from 5,135 in 1980. Id. "This 218% increase
exceeded the 59% growth in U.S. district court convictions for all federal offenses
during the same years and accounted for over 64% of the total increase in federal
convictions." DRUG AND CRIME FACTS, 1992, supra note 33, at 15.
175. In 1990, drug offenders accounted for nearly half (47%) of all persons
PORT:

sentenced to prison from federal courts, up from 27% in 1980.

SENTENCING IN

supra note 174, at 2-4.
176. Id. at 2, 4. The proportion increased from 72% in 1980 to 86% in 1990.
Id. Additionally, in 1989, 89.5% of convicted drug offenders were sentenced to
prison. Id.
177. Id. The number of federal drug offenders sentenced to prison rose 48%,
while the number of persons sentenced to prison for all other crimes rose only
14%. Id. The likelihood of incarceration for violent offenders also increased from
1986 to 1990, from 83% to 88%. Id. The likelihood of incarceration increased for
public-order offenses, from 37% to 43%, but remained unchanged for property
offenders, at 43% in both 1986 and 1990. Id. at 2.
178. Id. at 2, 4, 9. The average imposed sentence for all drug offenses was
TRANSITION,

62.2 months in 1986 and 81.2 months in 1990. Id. at 3 (table 2 and n.4).

179. Id. at 3. The average prison sentence for all violent crimes was 32% less
in 1990 than in 1986; for property offenses, it was 35% less; and for public order
offenses, it was 25% less. Id.
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reduced drug-related crime? This issue has been hotly debated.
However, there is little available information that establishes a positive correlation between increased incarceration and decreased
crime rates. Indeed, there is some evidence that increased incarceration has failed to reduce violent crime. As stated before, the
highest incarceration rates in the United States were between 1980
and 1993, yet violent crime rates rose faster between 1984 and 1993
than during either the 1960s or 1970s.
The average rate of incarceration was essentially stable from
1927 to 1980.180 There was some increase in the rate between 1970
and 1980, but a greater increase occurred between 1980 and 1990.
During that period, incarceration in state and federal prisons
doubled, from 138 per 100,000 to 271 per 100,000.181 Violent
crime, however, rose during this period.' 8 2 Thus, violent crime increased despite rapidly escalating incarceration rates in the 1980s.
This relationship between violent crime and incarceration in
the 1980s is particularly telling. Violent crime increased, even
though incarceration rates also increased. The extraordinary increase in incarceration that occurred during the 1980s should have
had its greatest influence on the crime rate from the mid-to-late
1980s into the 1990s. Instead, violent crime rates increased more
rapidly than ever during this time period. 18 3 There are two reasons
why lengthy periods of incarceration have not correlated into lower
crime rates. First, even with mandatory minimums, the likelihood
of any incarceration is small; and second, incarceration has not had
its intended specific or general deterrent effect.
There are vast numbers of hard-core drug users who possess
and obtain drugs. These numbers are far greater than the numbers
of users and drug offenders who are now incarcerated and who potentially could be incarcerated. In 1991, there were over 6 million
cocaine users, 5.7 million users of hallucinogens and inhalants, and
approximately 700,000 heroin users. 8 4 According to one estimate,
only about one-eighth of the hard-core cocaine and heroin abusers
180. BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS

1925-81, at 2 (1992). In 1928, the incarceration rate in state and federal prisons
was 96 per 100,000 population, the same rate as in 1973. Id.
181. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1990, supra note 21, at 604
(table 6.55).
182. CRIME REPORTS, 1993, supra note 31, at 23-31.
183. Id.
184. ELLIOT
TURE

CURRIE, RECKONING:

DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN

151 (1993).
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are now incarcerated.' 8 5 If we add the "non-user" offenders to
these "user" offenders, there are so many offenders that it is fiscally
and practically unrealistic to incarcerate more than a small number
of them.
The financial costs of operating prisons are legion. The construction and maintenance of prisons and jails costs billions of dollars a year. The average annual reported operating cost of the state
and federal prison systems in 1990 was $17,545.55 per inmate, and
the average annual cost of jail was $16,658.60 per inmate.1 8 6 If we
wanted to double the numbers of users and traffickers now incarcerated, we simply could not afford to hold them. We would leave
others still not incarcerated and "would do nothing to prevent new
ones from emerging in otherwise unchanged communities to take
87
the place of those behind bars."'
Incarceration may also have little effect on the crime rate if we
are incarcerating the "wrong" drug offenders. One result of our
response to the problem is the incarceration of low-level drug offenders: offenders with little or no prior criminal history, no violent
offense behavior and no involvement in sophisticated criminal activity. These offenders, who serve an average sentence of at least
5.75 years before release, constitute 21.2% of all sentenced federal
prisoners and 36.1% of all drug offender prisoners. 18 8
Among low-level drug offenders, sentences have increased
150% above what they were prior to the implementation of the
Guidelines and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts which established
mandatory minimums for drug offenses.'8 9 Two-thirds of these low185. Id. (noting that while American court system has been "flooded" with
drug-related cases, numbers are still small compared to overall potential).
186. BRANH M, supra note 22, at 20-21 (1992) (study by ABA Section on Criminal Justice). Costs directly attributable to the operations of prisons and jails are
commonly omitted from correctional department budgets and, therefore, omitted
from their reported costs. Id. at 21. These costs may include correctional employees' pensions and fringe benefits, litigation costs by the attorney general's office,
and the costs of educating inmates, all of which are sometimes excluded from the
budgets of state education or correctional education departments. In addition,
the amortized costs of facility construction are not included in operating costs.
When these additional expenses are considered, the "true cost of incarcerating
one person is at least $30,000 a year, almost twice the reported figure." Id.
187. CURRIE, supra note 184, at 152.
188. U.S. Department of Justice: An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders with
Minimal CriminalHistories, Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 2101, 2108-09 (Feb. 16,
1994) [hereinafter An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders] (noting that low-level
offenders with no criminal history points constitute 28.2% of all drug offenders
and 16.6% of all sentenced prisoners, and that approximately 42.3% of the lowlevel offenders were couriers or played peripheral roles in drug trafficking).
189. Id. at 2110-11; see also ABC News, Nightline: Judges Protest Mandatory Drug
Sentences (ABC television broadcast, July 14, 1993) (statement by Rep. Schumer
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level offenders received mandatory minimum sentences' 90
Under the Guidelines, offenders with mandatory minimum behavior are not being sentenced to mandatory minimum terms.' 9 1
"As late as the first half of 1990, almost half the offenders who
would appear to be eligible for a minimum term received a lesser
sentence." 9 2 Moreover, as is true of the federal offender population generally, the majority of mandatory minimum offenders (like
1 93
Patillo and Cadiz) have no prior criminal record.
Why are we incarcerating the "wrong offenders"? Although
one goal of the Guidelines was to eliminate discretionary sentencing, considerable discretion remains within the system. However,
much of this discretion is now with the prosecutor rather than the
judge. Prosecutors decide whether to charge, what to charge,
whether to offer a plea, what plea bargains are acceptable, and
whether to request a sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum because of a defendant's "substantial assistance" to the government. 94 The judge reviews the acceptability of plea bargains
and may choose to sentence below the minimum if provided the
opportunity to do so by the prosecutor. A sentence below a potentially applicable minimum therefore requires the concurrence of
the government and the court. Low-level drug offenders may be
unable to provide substantial assistance, and would therefore be dethat "mandatory minimums were enacted because the system had broken down,
that people who committed crime after crime after crime were not serving jail
time").
190. An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders, supra note 188, at 2110-11 (noting that "33.0% received no mandatory-minimum penalty, while 33% received a 5year mandatory-minimum penalty and another 33% received a 10-year mandatory-

minimum penalty");

MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-

supra note 88, at 10-11.
191. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE EFFECT OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS 9-10 (1992).
192. Id.; see also MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 88, at 91 (explaining that "[d]efendants whose offense conduct
TEM,

and offender characteristics appear to warrant application of mandatory minimum

sentencing provisions do not receive those sentences approximately 41% of the
time").
193. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 191, at 9-10, 14, 25.
194. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5Kl.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988); 28
U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988). Like 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines
requires a motion by the government for a departure based on substantial assistance. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5Kl.1. If the government refuses to request a
substantial assistance departure, the defendant must make a substantial threshold
showing that the refusal is not "rationally related to a legitimate government end"
before any right to discovery or a hearing on the issue of the refusal. Wade v.

United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (noting that "a defendant would be entifled to relief if a prosecutor refused to file a substantial assistance motion, say,
because of race").
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nied the opportunity to plea, making them more likely to be sentenced to a maximum term. Yet, the opposite is true for higherlevel offenders.1 95 Thus, our response has not increased the risk of
incarceration for higher-level offenders.
Incarceration also does not prevent new offenses by new offenders who do not view prison as punitive. When incarceration
"holds few terrors" for offenders, it has only a modest effect on
drug use, drug trafficking and drug-related crimes. 196 For many
drug offenders, prison is not stigmatizing, but rather a challenge to
be outwitted and overcome. Prison confers status and a "badge of
courage," or something to brag about when the offender is released
from prison and returns home.
Moreover, prison conditions are not terribly threatening to
many offenders. Some may not be socially isolated from family and
friends while confined, and for others, the food, shelter, clothing,
health services, recreation and level of physical safety are an improvement. 19 7 For these offenders, life in the inner city may be so
desperate that the threat of incarceration, by comparison, loses its
power to deter criminal activity. 198
Unfortunately, prison may also provide low-level drug offenders an education in "advanced drug-trafficking." These offenders,
195. ME1ERHOEFER, supra note 191, at 9-10 (arguing that discrepancy may be
result of defense attorneys more aggressively pursuing bargains for higher-level
offenders).
196. CURRIE, supra note 184, at 155, 158.
197. Id. at 160. One young Detroit drug dealer declared: "a lot of dudes like
prison because it's where all their boys is [sic]." Id. Few changes occurred in offender profiles of federal inmates from 1984 to 1990: The majority of sentenced
offenders had no prior record, were males, and were aged 27 to 35. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

STATISTICS 1991, at 648 (1992) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1991]. However, while the percentage of Hispanic offenders, and offend-

ers classified as "other," remained generally constant, and the percentage of white
offenders decreased from 60% to 53%, the percentage of black offenders increased from 21% to 26%. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 191, at 4. The only other
major change in the offender population - the percentage of offenders described
as using drugs increased from 16% to 27% - may represent increased drug use as
well as better or increased detection methods used during recent years. Id. The
typical state inmate is uneducated, has no high school degree, and is within the 1824 age bracket. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, supra, at 648.
One-third of the inmates were unemployed when arrested, more than half had
annual incomes of less than $10,000 and one fourth earned less than $3,000 during the year preceding their arrests. Id. The majority of state prison inmates were
raised by a single parent, and ofjail inmates surveyed in 1989, approximately 44%
of the females and 13% of the males reported being subjected to physical or sexual
abuse. BRANHAM, supra note 22, at 5.
198. Nathan McCall, A Lost Generation: Young, Black, Male - Why Do Inner-City
Black Men Seethe With Rage? RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 19, 1993, at F1, F3
(citations omitted).
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embittered by the system, develop relationships with high-level offenders.1 99 "The overuse of incarceration may strengthen the links
between street and prison, and help cement users and dealers identity as members of an operational drug culture, while simultaneously shutting them off from the prospect of successfully
participating in the economy outside the prison when they get
out."200

If imprisonment is not judged as severe as we presume it is, it
has important policy implications. Two of the purposes of punishment

-

retribution and deterrence

-

require that imprisonment

be deemed punitive. Theoretically, for prison to have the effect on
drug offenders that the public demands, a fundamental assumption
must be established: drug offenders must generally share the government's view of its punitiveness in the ranking of criminal sanctions.
If incarceration is to accomplish its deterrent function,
drug offenders must perceive it as more punitive and severe than
their current environment and other alternative sanctions. If they
do not, then legislators and judges - who imprison drug offenders
because of the drug war and the public's demand to get tough on
drug offenders - should consider other means besides prison to
exact punishment.
Imprisonment, however, serves purposes other than deterrence and retribution. Incarceration incapacitates offenders. In
that sense, drug offenders who may recidivate are removed from
the community.2 0 1 The effectiveness of incarceration in accomplishing its incapacitative purpose then is measured by the numbers
of offenders who are in fact incarcerated, and by the effect of incarceration on recidivism rates.
Federal drug offenders are no more likely to recidivate than
federal offenders overall. In fact, released drug offenders were less
20 2
likely than all other types of offenders to be returned to prison,
199. JEROME H. SKOLNICK ET AL., CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS,
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF STREET DRUG DEALING 13 (1989) (noting that prison
offers opportunity for inmates to "network" among potential drug-dealing
connections).

200. CURRIE, supra note 184, at 161.
201. Senator Dole once commented that "if people are in jail, they are not
going to commit any crimes, no question about it." 139 CONG. REc. S14,935 (daily
ed. Nov. 3, 1993). While this statement correctly posits that incarceration protects
the public, it ignores that crimes can be committed against other inmates and
correctional officers.
202. See DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1992, supra note 33, at 203
(1992) (stating that almost half of felony drug offenders placed on probation in
1986 were re-arrested for new felony within the next three years).
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and low-level drug offenders are much less likely to recidivate than
high-level offenders. 20 3 Moreover, if they do recidivate, they are unlikely to commit a violent crime. Thus, the United States Department ofJustice concluded that the length of incarceration does not
positively or negatively influence their recidivism. 20 4 The majority
of state and federal prison studies support this conclusion.2 0 5 In
sum, lengthy mandatory incarceration has little deterrent effect and
its effect on recidivism is questionable.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

We can maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system
and continue to punish drug offenders.2 0 6 However, we must limit
our incarceration resources. Dangerous drug offenders should be
incarcerated, with lengthy imprisonment periods. Drug traffickers
with prior criminal histories and violent offense behavior who engage in sophisticated criminal activities should be subject to long
203. See An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders, supra note 188, at 2102.
204. Id. at 2117. The report noted:
[The] amount of time inmates serve in prison does not increase or decrease the likelihood of recidivism, whether recidivism is measured as a
parole revocation, rearrest, reconviction, or return to prison . . . either
when the time served is examined alone in relation to recidivism, or
when controls are introduced for demographic variables (including age),
education, work experience, prior arrests, convictions, and incarcerations, drug and alcohol dependency, and post-release living
arrangements.
Id.
205. See generally ALLENJ.

BECK

& BERNARD E.

SHIPLEY,

BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STA-

TISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989); MILES D. HARER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S.

1987
(1994). For an analytical examination of recidivism, with a focus on statistical
modeling, see generally JAMES L. BECK & PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. BOARD OF PAROLE, TIME SERVED AND RELEASE PERFORMANCE: A FEDERAL SAMPLE (1975); PETER
SCHMIDT & ANN WITrE, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1988).
206. Decriminalization, in theory and in practice, can not be seen as an alternative solution to the drug crisis. To eliminate drug-related crime under a
"decrim" scheme, all drugs, including crack, heroin, ice and any new drug that
may come on the market, must be available to everyone, including juveniles.
These drugs must also be supplied in unlimited quantities. If not, the demand
would continue for drugs by juveniles, for drugs not yet legalized, and for additional quantities of drugs. The gap would be filled by a flourishing black market.
Moreover, although there is a link between violent crime and drug trafficking,
most drug-related crime is committed by drug users and buyers, not sellers. Drug
users, many with little or no income, commit crimes either in support of their
addiction or because of the pharmacological effect of drugs. Even if legalization
reduces the cost of drugs, it will not affect these crimes. Finally, the numbers of
pregnant addicts and drug-addicted babies would increase, rather than decrease,
with decriminalization. This problem, alone, should be sufficient to warrant continued criminalization.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISON RELEASES IN
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imprisonment terms and full institutional controls. By carefully developing sensible sentencing policies and a wide range of sanctions,
sensitive to resource limitations and public concerns, we can hold
drug offenders accountable to the public. We must reframe the
issue not in terms of what sounds tough for all drug offenders, but
in terms of what is most effective for most offenders.
There are viable alternatives to incarcerating all drug offenders. Intermediate sanctions may be just as effective in enhancing
public safety and yet less costly.20 7 Policymakers concerned with
more intelligent sentencing, in addition to "tougher" sentencing,
should consider alternatives to incarceration, rather than alternative incarceration.2 08 Less restrictive sanctions could include: (1)
quasi-incarceration, where an offender is supervised nine to twentythree hours per day in programs such as halfway houses, electronically monitored house arrest and residential drug treatment;2 0 9 (2)
intensive supervision, involving one to eight hours per day of direct
207. An educated public, with knowledge of the costs and alternatives, will
support intermediate sanctions, if more dangerous offenders are still incarcerated.
SeeJOHN DOBLE, THE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE
PUBLIC'S VIEW 12 (1987) (noting that "Americans are even more inclined to support alternatives to incarceration when they understand the cost of building and
maintaining new prisons"). This research study shows that the public would support alternatives to incarceration in particular cases because they believe prisons
fail to accomplish their primary objectives and fail to instill attitudes and values
that prepare inmates for jobs after their release. Id.; see also DONNA HUNZEKER,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, BRINGING CORRECTIONS

POLICY

INTO THE 1990s, at 3 (1992) (noting that by 1987, Delaware had "in place voluntary
sentencing guidelines that included intermediate sanctions").
208. The North Carolina sentencing guidelines establish a sentencing grid
with cells where sentencing judges may choose between incarceration and a
number of community sanctions scaled in two levels of high and low severity. See
Ronald F. Wright & Susan P. Ellis, A Progress Report on the North CarolinaSentencing
and Policy Advisory Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 421, 447-49 (1993) (discussing North Carolina law at proposal stage); NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND POIICY ADVISORY COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF NEW SENTENCING LAWS AND THE STATECOUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PARTNERSHIP ACT 7-37 (1993) (discussing North Carolina law to become effective January 1, 1995); see also NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL
TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 54 (1990) (arguing that "the nonincarceration punish-

ments must be perceived as not incommensurate in their severity to the prison
sentences to which there are alternatives").
209. Many legislators strongly supported the drug treatment provisions in the
1994 Crime Bill. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. H8723 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks) ("We all know that a great deal of crime is committed to
feed drug addictions. This substance abuse treatment program - by decreasing
drug and other substance dependencies- should lead to a corresponding decrease in the levels of crime."); 139 CONG. REc. H8725 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993)
(statement of Rep. Meek) ("We need treatment for drugs. We need it in prisons as
well as in other segments of the public."). Other legislators disagreed. See, e.g.,
139 CONG. REC. S14,940-02 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Instead of lowering prison sentences that are provided for offenders of drug traf-
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supervision, in which offenders are subject to curfew checks, employment checks and close monitoring for attendance in treatment
programs; or (3) minimal supervision, involving less than one hour
2 10
of contact per day.
Because intermediate sanctions may also be as punitive as imprisonment, it is no longer necessary to equate criminal punishment with incarceration. At some level of intensity and length,
intermediate sanctions are equally as severe or have the same punitive effect as prison, and may actually be the more dreaded penalty.
Developing and utilizing a full continuum of criminal sanctions is essential. It will reduce the overreliance on prisons, while
satisfying public demands that offenders be treated in a manner
that does not trivialize crime orjeopardize public safety. We should
not prefer incarceration, regardless of its costs and effectiveness,
simply because we have no other satisfactory alternative. A sufficient range of intermediate sanctions is available. For instance, in
the 1994 Crime Bill, Congress recommended state grants for "drug
court" programs with mandatory treatment, electronic monitoring
programs and boot camps. 2 11 A brief discussion of these alternatives is instructive.
A.

Electronic Monitoring

At least thirty states now use electronic monitoring, with a daily
average of 30,000 offenders, either as an alternative to incarcerating
non-violent offenders or as a condition of post-incarceration supervision. 2 12 The monitoring systems use electronic devices, often ankle bracelets, to alert corrections officials if offenders violate the
terms of their release or confinement. These devices trigger an
ficking and throwing money at treatment programs for nonviolent offenders, we
should build additional jails and prisons.").
210. See MICHAEL N. CASTLE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING: SELLING IT TO THE PUBLIC 1-5 (1991). Delaware has instituted all these
alternatives, at a savings of almost $8 million annually in corrections costs. Id. at 4.

In addition, Delaware's prison growth rate slowed to 5.8% over a two year period.
Id. Conversely, the prison growth rate for neighboring states was much higher:
Maryland, 15.8%; Virginia, 22.4%; NewJersey, 22.3%; New York, 25.8%; and Pennsylvania, 31.6%. Id.
211. For a discussion of the "drug court" programs under the 1994 Crime Bill,
see supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
212. Paul Barton, Crime and the Cost of Punishment, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June
27, 1993, at Al (noting that "there is renewed emphasis on 'intermediate sanctions' -

alternatives to prison -

that range from parole and probation, boot

camps, acupuncture treatment for drug abusers, electronic monitoring and community service work"). Cook County, Illinois, with 1,130 participants, has the largest electronic monitoring program in the country. Andrew Fegelman, Cook Monitor
System Sets Off a False Alarm, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1993, at 1.
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alarm if the offender goes beyond the bounds of confinement and
allow officials to verify that offenders meet specified curfews, such
as returning home immediately after work. The systems work by
randomly dialing the offenders' homes and alerting officials if offenders are more than an allowable distance away from a device
connected- to their home phones.
There are technical problems with electronic monitoring, including bracelet failures which allow offenders complete freedom,
or confused signals (such as calling the wrong phone). However,
these problems can be overcome with technological advances.
More serious problems involve the proportion of offenders who
have no telephones or who are homeless. Without a stable address
and phone, the program cannot be used for an otherwise eligible
offender.
However, there are advantages to electronic monitoring. It is a
cost-saving measure, allowing intensive supervision of an offender's
location while saving prison space. Additionally, the offender often
continues to work and pays the state for the cost of the monitoring.
Electronic monitoring is also seen as a less stigmatizing alternative
to incarceration.
B.

Boot Camps

Para-military boot camps in some form are already in operation in some state and federal correctional systems. 213 In 1993,
there were sixty-five adult boot camps in twenty-seven states and
nineteen juvenile camps in eight states. These camps generally target young non-violent offenders, ages eighteen to forty, although
programs for young adults are most common. They offer offenders
the opportunity to enter a structured, more demanding environment and to receive a shorter sentence.2 14 Programs range in duration from three to six months, and all programs involve strict
discipline, highly structured time and physical training. Most programs include academic and job training, and have an aftercare
component.
Boot camp programs vary in different states and it may be too
early to assess their overall impact on the criminal justice system.
The camps generally offer a cheaper alternative than traditional in213. Martin Anderson, Boot Camps Are Oversold, PLAIN

DEALER

(Cleveland),

Feb. 15, 1994, at 7B.
214. John Barbour, Young Inmates in Boot Camp March to Different Drummer,
April 11, 1993, at 4B; John Gorman, The Boot Fits: Special Camp Stint
Puts Ex Con on the Right Track, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 24, 1993, at 1 (noting that "these
inmates are willing to take 120 days of shock therapy to avoid five years of prison").
MLAMi HERALD,
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carceration,2 1 5 although at least one state found its boot camp program more costly, per inmate, than its prison system. 216 A hidden
cost of the programs is the cost of dropouts, who are then incarcerated and serve regular prison sentences. Recidivism rates for boot
camps are also mixed. Although programs in California boast an
21 7
improvement in recidivism rates of greater than fifty percent,
other programs found that boot camp recidivism rates approach
21 8
rates for the general prison release population.
On the whole, however, "[b] oot camps serve as a viable alternative to adding inmates to our already overcrowded federal [and
state prisons] ."219 Additionally, support seems strong in Congress
for boot camps, not only as an alternative for certain inmates, but
also precisely because they offer an inexpensive solution to the
22 0
prison overcrowding problem.
C.

Drug Court Treatment Programs

Drug courts are specialized courts for drug cases. Offenders
sentenced in many drug courts are not incarcerated, but are required to participate in a drug treatment program and are subject
to more direct supervision of their daily activities. Drug court treatment programs are present in approximately twenty-five cities and
counties, but not all drug courts are used to resolve drug cases with
treatment alternatives to incarceration. Other drug courts only segregate drug cases in specialized courtrooms or process drug cases
215. See, e.g., Barbour, supra note 214, at 4B. New York has the largest, most
successful program, with a 3,000 per year inmate capacity. Id. Additionally, the
program is cost effective, as it saved the state more than $220 million over five
years. Id.
216. Pat Doyle, PrisonBoot Camps: A Solution or a New Problem? Woes of Wisconsin ProgramStirDoubts About the Concept, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis - St. Paul), Nov. 1,
1993, at 1B (stating that "it cost [Wisconsin] twice as much per day to house an
inmate in the boot camp in 1991-92 than in other Wisconsin prisons").
217. Caroline Zinko, InstillingPride Boot Camp's OrderBuilds Disciplinein Female
Inmates, DETRorr FREE PREss, Mar. 5, 1993, at 3A ("Corrections officers say the
recidivism rate for PRIDE graduates is 33%, compared to 75-85% for the rest of
the jail population.").
218. For example, in Louisiana, 14% of those who finish boot camp are rearrested within six months, "about the same rate as other Louisiana parolees, according to a study by the U.S. Department ofJustice." Duke Helfand, Booted Into Shape,
LA. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1993, at JI; see also Anderson, supra note 213, at 7B (noting
similar results).
219. 139 CONG. REc. S14,950 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Heflin) ("This program is unique in that it targets first-time offenders, in an attempt to
keep them away from career criminals, who often lead young people into becoming repeat offenders.").
220. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S14,928-30 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Dorgan).
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with expedited case management principles.2 21
Proponents of drug court treatment programs claim that they:
(1) help judges gain "expertise" in dealing with drug offenses and
offenders, (2) force judges to use the full range of resources available when adjudicating drug cases, and (3) force judges to develop
"new" alternative methods to handle drug cases. 2 22 Opponents
claim that the quality of justice decreases in a segregated drug
court. Judges may have tunnel vision and may not evaluate drug
cases in the context of other crimes. "Canned" plea offers work
against individual attention to cases and defendants plead guilty,
even when innocent, because of light sentences, such as probation
and drug treatment.
The Dade County Drug Court, which has received national attention, was designed to divert first time non-violent drug offenders
into treatment, and to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction.
The court alters the adversarial role of the prosecutor and defense
attorney, as both are active participants who effectively "goad" drug
offenders to successful treatment. Progress is monitored by the sentencing judge rather than a probation officer and offenders are
usually retained in the program even when they fail to comply with
program mandates. Progress is tracked over a one-year treatment
period and offenders must appear before the judge every thirty to
sixty days. The judge expunges the criminal record upon successful
22 3
completion of the program.
The recidivism rate for first time Dade County drug offenders
was sixty percent, but for those who successfully completed the
Dade County Drug Court treatment programs, the recidivism rate
reported by Dade County officials was only seven percent. 22 4 Drug
court treatment programs are also cost effective. It costs Florida
only $2,000 to put a drug offender through a drug court program,
as compared to $17,000 per drug offender for incarceration. 2 25 As
221. See BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR COURTS TO COPE WITH
CASELOAD PRESSURE OF DRUG CASES, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION 7-11 (1991)
(examining Philadelphia's case management system and Milwaukee's specialized
drug court system); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, DRUG NIGHT COURTS: THE COOK COUNTY EXPERIENCE

(1994) (examining

Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois' use of specialized drug night court to combat their increasing drug caseload).
222. Richard L. Kassis, Drug Rehabilitation: Is a Drug Court the Answer? 3 PAC.
LJ. 595, 607 (1972) (citing Judge Joan Dempsey Klein of Los Angeles Municipal
Court).
223. Patrick May, Drug Treatment: The War's Next Front, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 7,
1990, at IA.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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a result, other drug court programs are being established through226
out the country.
The field of intermediate sanctions is relatively new and there
is no proven successful sanction for low-level drug offenders. However, we must examine intermediate sanctions and develop an effective system of punishing offenders who can be deterred from
future, more severe criminal activity.
D. Elimination of Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimum sentences should be eliminated from all
2 27
sentencing systems, for both theoretical and practical reasons.
Mandatory minimums are sentencing decisions made by the legislators. Legislators should establish sentencing policy, but sentencing
commissions and courts should effectuate that policy with sentencing decisions. Legislative policy should impact, rather than define,
case-by-case sentencing decisions. In addition to determining policy goals, legislators should define prohibited conduct, create the
overall sentencing structure, and establish resource appropriations
and fundamental procedures. Sentencing commissions should appropriately direct sentencing courts to presumptive dispositions,
consistent with the sentencing structure, for the "ordinary" offense
committed by the ''ordinary" offender. This direction should eliminate indeterminate sentencing and serve as a starting point for the
sentencing decisions. The actual sentencing decisions, in turn,
must be made by sentencing courts, and not by legislators. By enacting mandatory minimums, however, legislators have usurped the
courts' sentencing function.
The individualized sentencing role should rest solely with the
court because it must be implemented with knowledge of all relevant circumstances about the offense and the offender. There is no
"ordinary" offense or offender. Sentences should be determined
after consideration of the gravity of the actual offense and the degree of culpability of the individual offender. Mandatory mini226. For example, Florida passed a bill that allows other counties to set up
drug courts. Steve Bousquet, Drug Court Law Offers Treatment Instead of Prison,
MIAMI HERALD,

May 15, 1993, at 7B.

227. The ABA Sentencing Standards are consistent with this position. See
ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCE-

18-3.21(b) (1994) ("A legislature should not prescribe a minimum term of total confinement for any offense.")
(approved by the House of Delegates in Feb. 1993). Moreover, the Judicial Conference of the United States and the judges of the 12 Circuit Courts of Appeals
that hear criminal cases adopted resolutions opposing mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 83, at 93.
DURES AND APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES Standard
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mums, however, are based on one factor, relevant to the offense or
the offender, and ignore all other relevant factors, such as mitigating and aggravating circumstances. A sentencing decision is ajudgment, uniquely suited for judicial discretion, and this realm of
judicial discretion should be protected by legislators and sentencing commissions.
Determinate sentencing structures and judicial discretion are
not mutually exclusive. The legislatures and state sentencing agencies in many states have established a determinate sentencing structure, with permissive departure standards and appellate review. Yet,
the state sentencing courts impose presumptive sentences in a majority of cases. If there are a large number of departures, the sentencing agency may modify the standards or the guidelines. In rare
cases, the departures may justify modifying the criminal code.
Thus, there is a flexible approach to sentencing. Neither the legislative, the executive nor the judicial branch dominates the sentencing process and there is an ongoing dialogue about appropriate
sentences. A needed balance will be struck between case-by-case
sensitivity and systemic policymaking in sentencing.
In sum, it is essential to separate the structure of sentencing
from the sentencing policies the structure is designed to implement. Sentencing judges, when sentencing individual offenders,
should consider personal characteristics material and not material
to their culpability which may justify imposition of sentences of
lesser severity than would otherwise be imposed. Mandatory minimums preclude this type of consideration and should be
eliminated.
As noted earlier, four federal statutes account for approximately ninety-four percent of the mandatory minimum sentencing
cases and all four relate to drug offenses. 22 8 There are six commonly-offered rationales for mandatory minimum provisions: (1)
retribution, (2) deterrence, (3) incapacitation, especially of the serious offender, (4) elimination of disparity, (5) inducement of cooperation and (6) inducement of pleas. However, there are a
number of problems with these rationales.
Mandatory minimums are structurally in conflict with sentencing guideline systems and allow two types of sentencing disparity.
228. U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 83, at 11. These statutes include 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (1988) (manufacture and distribution of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C.
§ 960 (1988) (penalties for importation and exportation of controlled substances);
and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988) (minimum sentence enhancements for carrying a
firearm during drug or violent crime). Id.
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Offenders with different characteristics receive similar sentences
and defendants with similar characteristics receive different
sentences. Guidelines provide a sentencing range based on categories of offenses and offenders, while mandatory minimums utilize
the "tunnel vision" approach to sentencing. They focus on one factor relevant to the offense or one factor relevant to the offender.
Thus, the same minimum sentence must be imposed in cases involving widely divergent offense and offender characteristics. For
example, a defendant with a marginal role in the offense who accepts responsibility receives the same sentence as defendants with
higher levels of participation. The mandatory minimum precludes
application of a guideline sentence which is proportional to the defendant's level of culpability and need for punishment, and greater
demands are placed on prison resources than are necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing.229
Congress never intended for prison resources to be used in this
manner. Mandatory minimums were aimed at the high-level and
mid-level managers. Congress set mandatory minimums without
any indication that defendants with lower culpability levels should
serve ten and five-year sentences. Because defendants who should
receive mandatory minimums avoid them forty-one percent of the
time, lower-level drug offenders now constitute twenty-one percent
23 0
of the total sentenced federal prison population.
Moreover, there are no proportional increases in sentence severity with mandatory minimums. Similar to the mandatory minimums' failure to distinguish among offenders with diverse
culpability, they distinguish too greatly among offenders who have
committed offense conduct of similar seriousness. For example,
first-time offenders who possess 5.01 grams of crack face a
mandatory maximum of five years imprisonment. First-time offenders who possess 5.00 grams of crack face a statutory maximum of
one-year imprisonment.2 3 1 Thus, offenders whose cases differ only
229. See id. at 120. Low impact projections suggest that 981 offenders in fiscal
year 1990 received sentences above the applicable guideline range due to
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. Id. High impact projections suggest
that 2,121 offenders received higher sentences due to mandatory minimums with
an estimated total of 6,971 additional years of prison imposed. Id. Utilizing the
annual cost per inmate for fiscal year 1990 ($17,909), this finding indicates that
mandatory minimum provisions generated between $79 million and $125 million
additional costs for offenders sentenced in fiscal year 1990. Id.
230. See id. at 91; An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders, supra note 188, at
2110 (noting that "the majority of low-level drug law violators who are U.S. citizens
are kept in minimum security facilities").
231. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988). This statute provides in relevant part:
"Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprison-
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by the possession of .01 grams of crack face a four-year difference in
penalties. Again, the sentencing guidelines goal of reducing dispar23 2
ity is hampered by mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding sections indicate, federal statutes prescribe
increasingly harsh penalties for drug offenders. The Supreme
Court has not only sanctioned the penalties, but isolated them from
judicial review. Despite the severity of these new laws, however,
drug crimes continue and policy makers demand more severe penalties. The longer terms of incarceration dehumanize offenders
and perpetuate inequalities, and in turn, preserve the drug crime
status quo. The response to more drug crimes is more incarceration, and the response to more incarceration is more crime. The
cycle is closed; we ignore all alternatives and no one questions the
practice of using imprisonment to solve the drug problem.
We cannot continue our addiction to incarcerating drug offenders, because the consequences of this addiction are clear - we
are ineffective in controlling and preventing crime. To be sure,
treating drug crimes with preventive measures is complicated and
there are no easy solutions. However, to cure the addiction, we
must seek alternative solutions. The quest begins with the simple
realization that preserving the dignity of every individual, even the
convicted drug offender, is paramount to the pursuit of justice.
ment of not more than one year and shall be fined a minimum of $1,000, or both,
except that if he [or she] commits such offense after a prior conviction." Id.
232. There is also evidence that mandatory minimums have a disparate impact on African-American offenders. The Sentencing Commission found that a
greater proportion of African-American defendants (67.7%) received sentences at
or above the indicated mandatory minimum than white (54%) or hispanic
(57.1%) defendants. U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 83, at 78. The report concluded
that "defendants who appear to be similar are charged and convicted pursuant to
mandatory minimum provisions differentially depending upon such factors as
race, circuit, and prosecutorial practices." Id. at 91.
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